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This dissertation is broadly concerned with the question: how do human cognitive limitations
inﬂuence difﬁcult sentences? The focus is a class of grammatical restrictions, locality con-
straints. The majority of relations between words are local; the relations between question
words and their governors are not. Locality constraints restrict the formation of these non-local
dependencies. Though necessary, the origin, operation, and scope of locality constraints is a
controversial topic in the literature.
The dissertation describes the implementation of a computational model that clariﬁes these
issues. The model tests, against behavioral data, a series of cognitive constraints argued to
account for locality. The result is an explanatory model predictive of a variety of cross-linguistic
locality data. The model distinguishes those cognitive limitations that affect locality processing,
and addresses the competence-performance debate by determining how and when cognitive
constraints explain human behavior. The results provide insight into the nature of locality
constraints, and promote language models sensitive to human cognitive limitations.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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Is syntactic locality a processing phenomenon? This topic has been central to the compe-
tence and performance debate in linguistics for half a century, leading to advances in both
grammatical and processing theories. Yet it has also resulted in sometimes contentious dis-
agreements among linguists and psycholinguists regarding the origin and nature of the phe-
nomenon. These disagreements underscore the increasing importance of understanding how
competence and performance interact in language comprehension.
This dissertation employs a human sentence processing model armed with cognitive con-
straints to predict syntactic locality difﬁculty. The cognitive constraints test reductionist, or
performance-based, accounts of syntactic locality. The broad-coverage nature of the model
allows for an examination of multiple syntactic locality phenomena, represented by experimen-
tal data across a variety of languages, in a single architectural model. The aim is to determine
whether locality is a processing phenomenon, a competence phenomenon, or both.
The results demonstrate that a model that uses solely cognitive constraints can model
weak islands and superiority violations. More speciﬁcally, weak islands are a result of multiple
working memory factors, including activation and interference. Superiority violations, on the
other hand, are a result of interference only. The cognitive constraints are not able to model
strong islands, indicating this particular locality violation is a result of either a grammatical
constraint or even an untested cognitive factor.
The remaining sections of this chapter provide more details that motivate this dissertation
topic and its results. Section 1.2 provides further background into syntactic locality and the
1problem this dissertation addresses. Section 1.3 discusses the signiﬁcance of the results to
the syntactic locality debate, as well as to other areas such as computational linguistics and
psycholinguistics. Section 1.4 provides an overview of each of the chapters in this dissertation.
1.2 Overview of the problem
This work develops a computational model of a pervasive aspect of language comprehension,
syntactic locality. The majority of the relations between words are local; however, the relation
between question words and their governors are not. (1) demonstrates one such sentence,
where what is distant from its governor, read.
(1) What do you think that Diego read?
Not all non-local dependencies between words are possible in natural language. Many are
constrained. For example, sentences like (2) are considered difﬁcult by English speakers.
(2) *What do you wonder whether Diego read?
Here, there is a constraint on the long-distance dependency because the wh-word has a gov-
ernor that is within a clause headed by another wh-word, whether. Historically, these locality
constraints have been considered a central component of language competence (Ross, 1967;
Chomsky, 1973; Rizzi, 1990; Cinque, 1990).
This work explores whether syntactic locality constraints may be better explained by a
language-independent factor, memory. A parser implements reductionist theories (Clifton &
Frazier, 1989; Clifton, Fanselow, & Frazier, 2006; Arnon, Snider, Hofmeister, Jaeger, & Sag,
To Appear; Hofmeister, 2007; Hofmeister, Jaeger, Sag, Arnon, & Snider, 2007; Hofmeister &
2Sag, 2010), and acts as an interpretation of what is happening in the brains of listeners as
they hear locality-violating sentences such as (2). It is a working model of human sentence
processing that is consistent with a variety of memory and syntactic locality theories. Rather
than use grammatical constraints, the parser uses language-independent cognitive constraints
derived from general cognitive research (Anderson, 1976, 2005; Wanner & Maratsos, 1978;
Gibson, 2000; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005).
The parser’s difﬁculty is calculated as it interprets English, German, Swedish, and Russian
violations, including strong islands (represented by complex-NP island violations, CNPs), weak
islands (represented by wh-island violations, WHIs), and non-island locality (represented by
superiority violations, SUVs). The difﬁculty predicted by each of the cognitive constraints is
compared to human difﬁculty. If the parser ﬁnds the same patterns of difﬁculty as the human
without requiring explicit grammatical constraints, the model supports reductionist claims. If
the parser does not ﬁnd the same patterns, it indicates either a problem with the reductionist
claims or that the phenomenon requires grammatical constraints.
The results demonstrate that the cognitive theories model weak and non-island locality
without requiring speciﬁc grammatical constraints. Speciﬁcally, weak islands are best-modeled
by reductionist theories that incorporate both activation-based and interference-based difﬁ-
culty. SUVs, on the other hand, are a result of solely interference-based difﬁculty. The cogni-
tive constraints do not, however, model the strong island data. As these results are supported
by a working model, a rethinking of syntactic locality, and the competence-performance divide,
is needed.
31.3 Signiﬁcance
These results are directly applicable to work in linguistics, psycholinguistics, and computational
linguistics. In linguistics, the results help illuminate the nature of syntactic locality, and highlight
which phenomena are best explained by a grammatical approach. The goal of syntax is to
encode a speaker’s knowledge of language, or competence, in the simplest possible terms
(Chomsky, 1965). Reductionist approaches take this aim to heart, demonstrating that some
phenomena are not caused by a speaker’s knowledge, but rather how that knowledge is put
to use. By providing explanations that center on general cognitive constraints, reductionist
accounts minimize the phenomena competence is accountable for, thereby simplifying the
grammar. Yet these approaches are often met by criticism because they do not ground difﬁculty
to explicit cognitive mechanisms, or they use questionable experimental methods that can not
distinguish competence from performance factors (Phillips, In Press).
This work seeks to arbitrate this debate by providing explicit deﬁnitions of cognitive theories
on a working computational model. Further, the work considers a variety of results that argue
both for and against reductionist approaches. Testing explicit cognitive theories against a va-
riety of cross-linguistic experimental data offers a broad examination of reductionist explana-
tions for syntactic locality. This not only addresses the concerns of proponents of competence
approaches, but it also provides an implemented test of the reductionist accounts.
The results indicate that those in favor of competence accounts of locality should focus
their attention more on the nature of strong islands than on weak islands and superiority vio-
lations. Mathematically, a grammatical bound of movement is advantageous: unconstrained
movement would create a grammar that over-generates and allows for constructions that are
outside the realm of natural language (Stabler, 1997; G¨ artner & Michaelis, 2007). Yet this
constraint should be centered on phenomena like strong islands rather than weak islands or
SUVs. The grammar can be simpliﬁed by relegating the latter to performance, as they are
4modeled by general cognitive factors and also follow from working memory claims. Those in
favor of a full competence account of all syntactic locality phenomena should focus on gram-
maticized constraints of speciﬁc working memory factors like activation and interference. A
comparison of claims like Relativized Minimality (Rizzi, 1990; Cinque, 1990) to activation and
interference may also lead to fruitful competence-based research.
On the other hand, psycholinguists and linguists in favor of performance-based accounts of
syntactic locality should focus on the positive result for weak islands and superiority violations.
These two phenomena not only behave as the cognitive theories predict, but they also demon-
strate how phenomena long considered distinct in linguistic theory can also be distinguished
by cognitive accounts.
Although reductionist arguments for strong islands are not supported in this work, this could
be a result of the speciﬁc cognitive theories considered here. The retrieval-based theories work
well for weak islands and superiority violations; this is not surprising because long-distance re-
trievals and similarity-based interference are both available for these phenomena. With strong
islands, interference is not a factor, particularly for those cases considered in this work. Fur-
ther, experimenal evidence indicates that a retrieval may not even be occurring (Stowe, 1986).
In this case, a better cognitive model of strong islands would implicate storage difﬁculty rather
than retrieval difﬁculty.
Determining which cognitive factors contribute to processing difﬁculty can often be as con-
tentious in psycholinguistics as the competence-performance debate is. This research pro-
vides a methodology for testing the speciﬁc constraints on a broad-coverage parser. For
example, it can be difﬁcult to understand the differences between the Dependency Locality
Theory (DLT) (Gibson, 2000) and retrieval (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005), two psycholinguistic the-
ories sensitive to both activation and interference difﬁculty. Theoretically, the two theories take
into account different factors to predict difﬁculty, yet they can often make the same predictions.
A broad-coverage computational model can quickly compute predictions for these and other
5theories, helping to deﬁne the similarities and differences, and the strengths and weaknesses,
of each of these theories against real experimental data.
This research is also signiﬁcant to psycholinguistics because it helps to strengthen the level
of explicitness in performance-based accounts. Experimental results may implicate a quantity
like decay or interference in human sentence processing difﬁculty for some phenomenon. But
what is decay in the human parser? Is a simple metric like distance adequate to model the
data? Or do the results require a more sophisticated model that operates on general cognitive
predictions from connectionist calculations? Similarly, what is the nature of interference? Do
speciﬁc types of words and phrases always create difﬁculty, or is difﬁculty the result of too many
similar structures in memory? The methodology reported here provides a framework that can
answer these questions for speciﬁc experimental results. This provides a level of explicitness
required to address concerns against reductionist accounts of linguistic phenomena.
Finally, because this research is computational in nature, it takes advantage of many ad-
vances in natual language processing (NLP) and computational psycholinguistics. However, it
is hoped that it offers something in return. First of all, cognitive constraints for syntactic locality
may provide an important tool for parsing unbounded dependencies. Unbounded dependen-
cies have recently become an important topic in statistical NLP because they are a challenge
for parsing. As in language, the majority of the relationships in treebanks are local. This
creates a skewed data set, which can be problematic for accuracy since short, local depen-
dencies are given the same rating as long, non-local dependencies (Nivre, Rimell, McDonald,
& G´ omez-Rodr´ ıguez, 2010).
However, when only the long dependencies are considered, parser accuracy is dismally
low on many of the state-of-the-art parsers, including the transition system considered in this
work (Nivre et al., 2010). Humans do not have difﬁculty with these long-distance dependen-
cies, particularly the grammatical examples that are provided in treebanks. Perhaps what is
required is more human-like probabilistic features, which take into account the level of work-
6ing memory difﬁculty a human is predicted to have with each unbounded dependency. The
cognitive constraints considered here operate remarkably well on the unbounded dependen-
cies for the syntactic locality data. This would further support previous approaches that have
found human-like memory helpful in broad-coverage parsing (Schuler, AbdelRahmen, Miller,
& Schwartz, 2010).
One important challenge facing computational psycholinguistics is a standardization of
training, testing, and development sets for broad-coverage models. Broad-coverage mod-
els are preferable because they are full-scale working models, not toy grammars which only
work for a few phenomena or experimental sets (Crocker, 2005). The same model can be
used to test a variety of experimental data, and can also be challenged to account for a variety
of phenomena. Standard data sets would not only help verify accuracy in human sentence
processing models, but also bring computational psycholinguistics in line with computational
linguistic practices (Keller, 2010).
Unfortunately, these data sets are not available at the time of this study. Further, it’s not
clear when they will be available. This methodology reﬂects an attempt to keep the broad-
coverage model accountable even without the standardized data sets. The data tested con-
sists of a variety of experimental results. In includes data that both supports and refutes the
claims it is testing, and it incorporates a variety of theories that make speciﬁc and often con-
trasting predictions. Overﬁtting is not possible on this data set, particularly given the way that
accuracy is measured. This methodology may be useful for other human sentence processing
models that lack standardized data sets.
71.4 Chapter overview
Chapter 2: Syntactic locality
This chapter provides an overview of syntactic locality, and its central role in the competence
and performance debate. It introduces Dependency Grammar (DG), and then discusses stan-
dard locality constraints for strong islands, weak islands, and superiority violations. Subse-
quent sections detail syntactic and semantic approaches to explaining data that challenges
these constraints, and introduce arguments against a competence approach.
Chapter 3: Cognitive constraints
The second chapter discusses the major claims made by reductionists in support of a performance-
based approach to syntactic locality. It provides background on the role of working memory
in processing difﬁculty, and then introduces the speciﬁc cognitive constraints implicated in
reductionist accounts. This chapter lays the foundation for the activation, interference, and
combination constraints that are encoded in the computational model.
Chapter 4: A computational model
This chapter provides the implementation details of the human sentence processing model
used in this work, a statistical dependency parser. It motivates the use of the Nivre non-
projective transition system (2009) as a model. Although the parser is central to the work, there
are a variety of peripheral implementation details crucial to this research. This chapter also
details these, including training on treebank data, encoding cognitive theories probabilistically,
and encoding complexity metrics that measure parser difﬁculty.
8Chapter 5: Experiments
This work takes into account experimental data that either support or challenge reduction-
ist approaches. This chapter discusses the categorization these experiments, organized by
the speciﬁc phenomena considered in this work. For each phenomenon (strong islands, weak
islands, and superiority violations), a series of experimental data was collected: classic experi-
mental data that demonstrate the typical judgments of difﬁculty, gradience data that support re-
ductionist accounts, and challenging data that is problematic for reductionist accounts. These
experiments sample human difﬁculty across four languages (English, German, Swedish, and
Russian), and also incorporate a variety of measures, including reading times and acceptability
judgments.
Chapter 6: A methodology for cognitive modeling
This research is novel because it tests many factors at once. It uses a broad-coverage, cross-
linguistic dependency parser, it tests against a variety of experimental data types, and it con-
siders many different cognitive theories. The broad range of data, methodologies, and testable
theories requires an explicit methodology that addresses the central question: which reduc-
tionist theories account for which syntactic locality phenomena? This chapter outlines the
methodology, discussing how experimental data is prepared, how the parser is run, and how
parser difﬁculty is compared to human difﬁculty.
Chapter 7: Results
The results section details how each of the cognitive constraints fare against each of the
experimental results. These results are aggregated by phenomenon to offer a higher-level dis-
cussion on which cognitive theories best explain strong islands, weak islands, and superiority
9violations. The results indicate that strong islands can not be modeled by the cognitive theo-
ries, but weak islands and superiority violations can. The broad implications of these results
are then discussed.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
The ﬁnal chapter of this dissertation provides a summary of the ﬁndings, as well as a compar-
ison of these ﬁndings to other research. I then discuss how these ﬁndings contribute to the




This chapter describes syntactic locality as a linguistic phenomenon, detailing its origins, how
it has challenged prevailing theories, and how linguistic theories have expanded to encompass
locality constraints.
Before discussing locality itself, this chapter provides a brief background on Dependency
Grammar (DG) (Tesni` ere, 1959; Hays, 1964), the grammar used throughout this research.
Section 2.3 discusses classic examples of the syntactic locality phenomena considered here:
Complex Noun Phrase Islands (CNPs), Wh-Islands (WHIs), and Superiority Violations (SUVs).
Section 2.4 then discusses exceptions to the constraints, and necessary accommodations
within the theories. Section 2.6 outlines several limitations of grammatical theories that have
led to various reductionist arguments provided in the next chapter.
2.2 Dependency grammar
DG analyzes sentence on the basis of word-to-word dependencies. Figure 2.1 depicts a de-
pendency analysis of a simple English sentence. In this sentence, there is a dependency
between sailed and Diego, with sailed being the head of Diego and Diego being the depen-
dent of sailed. All the words in the sentence have a head except for the main verb sailed;
this word is called the root of the sentence, and has special status. Dependencies generally
follow standard linguistic patterns, with subjects and objects depending on the main verb, and
constituents depending on phrasal heads.
11Diego sailed the boat
Figure 2.1: A DG example.
One way in which DG differs from more popular formalisms is that it does not have phrasal
nodes; in fact, DG ultimately places little importance on constituency, and instead focuses on
the obvious connections between words. The main advantage of this system is that it makes
language description easier, particularly for non-conﬁgurational languages. The example in
Figure 2.2 is from Czech, a language that has freer word order than English. The sentence
translates to “A strong individual will obviously withstand a high risk better than a weak individ-
ual”, but notice the discontinuity among dependencies. This discontinuity is easily handled by
DG since constituents can appear anywhere in the sentence. The only complication is cross-






















Figure 2.2: Czech, a non-conﬁgurational language, has sentences with discontinuous con-
stituents. These sentences are difﬁcult for phrase structure systems.
Though simple, DG is one of the oldest formalisms: evidence suggests that P¯ an .ini used
dependencies to describe Sanskrit in the 4th century B.C. Its modern linguistic roots date back
to the late 1950s, when Tesni` ere described sentences as sequences of “word-to-word connec-
tions” (1959). This simple analysis of syntactic structure was also found to be advantageous
for computational applications, and was the syntactic component in early machine translation
(Hays, 1964).
12Mainstream linguistics came closest to embracing DG in the 1970s when lexicalized for-
malisms became popular. In X-bar theory (Chomsky, 1970), phrasal nodes are created from
heads, which are often existing words within a sentence. Although X-bar theory made use
of phrasal nodes and covert information, such as traces, it also shared with DG a focus on
relationships between overt words.
In the 1980s, DG was recognized as an excellent tool for language description, particu-
larly for non-conﬁgurational languages. Mel’ˇ cuk (1988) explored DG as a grammar for Czech,
a language that poses many challenges for conﬁgurational grammars, as Figure 2.2 demon-
strates. Through both Mel’ˇ cuk’s work and the Word Grammar approach of Hudson (n.d.), DG
was expanded to a full-scale descriptive and explanatory language theory.
Currently, DG is undergoing a resurgence in statistical NLP. This simple formalism can be
easily inferred from treebanks, and has led to state-of-the art results1. Objectors argue that
the formalism is too simple to describe the full complexity of language. In fact, despite efforts
by Hudson and Mel’ˇ cuk, DG can not easily handle constituency, and it may be mathematically
impossible for it to handle crucial notions in language such as c-command2.
Although the grammar is too simple to accurately describe natural language, this could
in fact be a feature. Dependencies are an incontrovertible aspect of language structure: all
grammars must formalize the notion of dependency, and it provides a common thread across
formalisms. This is particularly beneﬁcial for a human sentence processing model, as the
simplest possible grammar can be tested. Secondly, as was discussed above, DG will con-
tinue to be an important descriptive tool for non-conﬁgurational languages, as more restrictive
formalisms are still not able to accurately handle many structures. Finally, DG has had and
continues to provide important contributions to both computational and mathematical linguis-
tics, as is further discussed in Chapter 4.2.
1See Chapter 4.2.1 for details.
2See Chapter 7.4.2 for details.
132.3 Syntactic locality phenomena
The majority of the dependencies between words in a sentence are local, but some are more
distant. One common long-distance dependency occurs in questions, as in Figure 2.3. Here,
the question word is at the front of the sentence, even though it should appear at the end of
the sentence as the object of the verb sailed.
What did she say that Diego sailed
Figure 2.3: In English questions, the question word appears at the beginning of the sentence.
Locality conditions provide guidelines, or constraints, on long-distance dependencies. Fig-
ure 2.4 shows an ungrammatical sentence that includes an illegal long-distance dependency.
What did she say that who sailed
Figure 2.4: If another wh-word intervenes, the sentence becomes difﬁcult.
The intervening wh-phrase, in this case who, prevents the long-distance dependency from
being acceptable. Characterizing why this is the case is a central topic of Ross’s seminal dis-
sertation (1967), and has since become a central topic in theoretical linguistics and syntax.
This dissertation considers three phenomena that violate locality conditions, leading to sen-
tence difﬁculty. Two are examples of islands, and are described further in Section 2.3.1. The
other phenomenon details SUVs, and is discussed further in Section 2.3.2.
142.3.1 Islands
Although explanations for syntactic locality exist in a variety of formalisms like Generalized
Phrase-Structure Grammar (Fodor, 1992), Tree-Adjoining Grammar (Frank, n.d.), and Opti-
mality Theory (Legendre, Wilson, Smolensky, Homer, & Raymond, 2006), this section focuses
on research from the transformational grammar tradition. In this tradition, questions and other
long-distance dependencies are conceptualized as movement. The idea is that the wh-word
originates in its correct place thematically, usually near its head word. Then, because of dis-
course or other factors, the word is extracted from its base position and moves to a higher
position in the sentence. A typical account of the sentences above in this framework is as in
Figure 2.5. As can be seen here, what moves from a position in the complement of the VP to
the beginning of the sentence, and leaves behind a trace, ti
3.
The term island falls out naturally from this movement conception of language: islands are
barriers to movement, and do not allow wh-words to pass through them (Ross, 1967). This
work considers two types of islands: strong and weak. The main difference between the two is
what can pass through: weak islands allow a prepositional phrase to extract, but strong islands
do not (Cinque, 1990). Another distinction, more relevant given the experimental literature
considered here, is based on what kinds of wh-phrases can extract. Weak islands allow some
arguments to extract, but not adjuncts. Strong islands allow neither (Szabolcsi & den Dikken,
2002). (3) through (6) show examples from Szabolcsi and den Dikken (2002) that demonstrate
this distinction. (3) and (4) are weak islands, where the island headed by whether is denoted
within the brackets. Although extracting the adjunct why leads to difﬁculty in (4), extracting an
argument like when in (3) does not. In the strong island examples in (5) and (6), on the other
hand, both are difﬁcult.
(3) ?When did John ask [whether to ﬁre him]?
3Because the focus here is on aspects of syntactic locality pertinent to DG analyses, details like the Subject-



































Figure 2.5: Question formation in the generative framework.
(4) *Why did John ask [whether to ﬁre him]?
(5) *When did John bring [the girl who asked]?
(6) *Why did John bring [the girl who asked]?
The strong and weak island distinction does not reﬂect a difference in processing difﬁculty:
strong islands are not considered harder than weak islands. Rather, it reﬂects what kinds of
16phrases are allowed to extract.
There is often controversy regarding what is an argument and what is an adjunct, ex-
actly how strong and weak islands differ, and what kinds of phrases can extract in different
languages. Experimental evidence supports this controversy (Kluender, 1992; Keller, 1996;
Yoshida, 2006). Even though the distinction between strong and weak islands is not always
clear, many agree that it does exist (Szabolcsi & den Dikken, 2002); further, psycholinguistic
work and even this computational study supports a distinction between the two on the basis of
the competence and performance divide (Kluender, 1992, 1998). The following two subsec-
tions describe the particular strong and weak islands considered, CNPs and WHIs.
Strong islands
The strong island considered in this work is the Complex Noun Phrase Island, which doesn’t
allow extractions from within a deﬁnite noun phrase with a relative clause. A classic example
is provided in Figure 2.6 (Hofmeister & Sag, 2010). Here, the dependency between who and
captured, depicted with a dashed blue line, is illegal. This is because who is within a complex

































Figure 2.6: An example of a CNP violation.
There are other types of strong islands, including complex noun phrases with complement
clauses, subject islands, and adjunct islands. The reader is referred to Szabolcsi and den
Dikken (2002) for more information on these islands. This work focuses on this strong island
17because the majority of the experimental evidence, particularly for English, includes CNPs
with relative clauses.
Various locality hypotheses seek to explain why extraction from CNP islands is not accept-
able. The ﬁrst, from Ross (1967), is provided in (7):
(7) Complex NP Constraint: No element contained in a sentence dominated by a noun
phrase with a lexical head noun may be moved out of that noun phrase by transforma-
tion (Ross, 1967, p.127).
Later, as linguists sought to create omnibus constraints that handled more cross-linguistic
data, CNP islands were explained by subjacency (Chomsky, 1973, 1977). Subjacency argues
that moved elements can not cross more than one bounding node. Bounding nodes for English
are the determiner phrase (DP), or noun phrase, and S, the sentential phrase (currently IP).
The idea of bounding nodes is central to the current explanation for CNPs, the ECP (Empty
Category Principle) (Aoun, Hornstein, & Sportiche, 1982). The ECP requires traces, or gaps in
psycholinguistic terminology, be properly governed by their antecedents, or ﬁllers. Proper gov-
ernment in this case is antecedent-government. Antecedent-government requires two things:
that the ﬁller c-command its gap (Reinhart, 1976), and that there be at most one barrier on
the path between the ﬁller and its gap. Figure 2.7 shows a fragment from one of the CNP
island violations in an experimental study by Hofmeister and Sag (2010). The full island is I
saw who Emma doubted reports that we had captured.... Given this analysis, we can see that
who does c-command its trace, because the trace is a descendent of who’s sister node, IP.
However, there are two barriers, or IPs, on the path between who and its trace ti. Therefore,



































Figure 2.7: There are too many barriers between who and its trace, in violation of the ECP.
Weak islands
The standard weak island is the Wh-Island, where phrases headed by wh-words are islands
to movement. Figure 2.8 provides an example from experimental data (Hofmeister & Sag,


























Figure 2.8: An example of a WHI violation.
The ﬁrst deﬁnition of WHIs, from Ross (1967), was relatively broad, as (8) demonstrates:
(8) Wh-Island Constraint: Wh-words can not be moved across across other wh-words
(Ross, 1967)
This deﬁnition is too broad because it encompasses two separate locality phenomena, WHIs
and SUVs. Although Subjacency and the ECP restrict movement across the wh-phrase bound-
ary, they are too constricting since weak islands allow some words to “escape”. Therefore,
theories like Relativized Minimality (Rizzi, 1990; Cinque, 1990) are considered to be more
applicable to WHIs. These theories are discussed further in the next section on gradience.
2.3.2 Superiority violations
Unlike islands, SUVs do not require discussion of bounding nodes. Rather, the focus is on
structural roles: a wh-word can not be moved across a “structurally higher” wh-word (Chomsky,
1973). Figure 2.9 shows an example. Here the object what is moved across the subject who.
The deﬁnition from Ross in (8) above accurately captures the intuition behind SUVs. This











Figure 2.9: An example of a SUV violation.
1977). However, SUVs are considered part of this study because their difﬁculty in English is
that SUVs are difﬁcult in English is well-documented in the psycholinguistic literature.
212.4 Gradience in locality
One of the biggest sources of gradience in all three locality phenomena comes from the ﬁller-
type. Example (9) shows an SUV that is difﬁcult because the wh-word when crosses who4.
As noted by Karttunen (1977), replacing who with a which-N construction as in (10) leads to a
more acceptable sentence.
(9) *Wheni did who eat the sandwich ti?
(10) Which sandwich will who eat?
Pesetsky (2000) notes that this occurs whether the which-N is the extracted element or the
intervenor, as demonstrated in (11).
(11) What will which contestant eat?
In both (10) and (11), the superiority constraint is violated, yet speakers report the sentences
are more acceptable than the SUV in (9). These intuitions are supported by experimental ev-
idence. Arnon and her colleagues (To Appear) examine sentences like those in Figure 2.10,
conﬁrming Karttunen’s and Pesetsky’s intuitions. Here, the which-N cases are more accept-
able, given the experimental measure of Residual Reading Times (RRT), than the bare exam-
ples5.
SUVs are even evident in naturally-occurring text. Examples (12) and (13) were discovered
in Internet articles by Sag, Hofmeister, Arnon, Snider, and Jaeger (2008).
4It should be noted that in the generative tradition who also moves. However, because this movement does
not affect the surface ordering, it is left out of these examples.





















































Figure 2.10: Experimental evidence of SUV gradience from RRT measurements.
(12) What did who know and when did they know it?
(http://www.antigonishreview.com/bi-113/113curb.html)
(13) What did who say and who did the asserting?
(http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030512/cockburn)
CNPs and WHIs also exhibit this kind of gradience. Figure 2.11 shows that which convict
has faster residual reading times (and is therefore more acceptable) than the bare extraction,
who, for the CNP. Figure 2.12 shows that the same pattern holds for WHIs with reading times.



























































































































Figure 2.12: Experimental evidence of WHI gradience from RT measurements.
2.5 Explanations from linguistic theory
The examples from the previous section demonstrate that the locality constraints can be vio-
lated. An adequate explanations has to take this into account. Much of the linguistic literature
that accounts for examples of this kind of ﬁller gradience focuses on WHIs. This section details
this research.
2.5.1 A syntactic explanation for gradience
One hypothesis that addresses WHI violations is at the interface between syntax and seman-
tics/pragmatics. The previous section provided examples demonstrating the acceptability of
extracting which-N constructions from wh-islands. Pesetsky’s D-linking (or Discourse-Linking)
hypothesis (1987) argues that this is because which-N phrases delimit a set of possible enti-
ties, making them easier to extract than other wh-words. For example, the sentence in (10), re-
peated in (14), is acceptable for native English speakers even though which sandwich crosses
the wh-island who.
(14) Which sandwichi will who eat ti?
According to Pesetsky, this is because the content of the extracted element is a delimited set:
it is a set of sandwiches. This is easier than an unrestricted set, such as the set referred to by
what in (15).
24(15) *Whati will who eat ti?
Here, what can refer to sandwiches or cookies or pizza or any kind of food. According to
Pesetsky, which-N phrases are easier because they are linked to a limited set by the discourse.
Pesetsksy’s D-linking hypothesis is extended by Rizzi (1990) and by Cinque (1990) to
account for a variety of linguistic dependencies, including island violations. Their hypothe-
ses use D-linking to differentiate between referential and non-referential determiner phrases
(DPs) (Cinque, 1990). Which-N constructions are referential, or refer to “speciﬁc members of
a preestablished set” (Cinque, 1990, p.8). Cinque and Rizzi both argue that referential DPs
can be extracted from WHIs, and other structures, because their traces do not require a local
co-index. In DG terms, words that refer to members of a preestablished set can be governed
by words outside their immediate constituent. Non-referential DPs, on the other hand, must
be governed by words that are within the constituent.
Taking the ungrammatical example in (15) above, Rizzi and Cinque would argue that the
island will be violated because what’s trace is not governed locally within the phrase who eat.
This results in ungrammaticality because what does not refer to speciﬁc members within a
preestablished set. Which sandwich, on the other hand, does not need to be locally governed
because it refers to the members of a preestablished set, fsandwichesg.
2.5.2 A semantic explanation for gradience
The referentiality argument promoted by Rizzi and Cinque provides syntactic motivation for
gradience in wh-islands. However, the account prompts the next logical question: why are ref-
erential DPs special? This section describes approaches that provide semantic explanations.
de Swaart (1992) and Kiss (1993) claim that WHIs exist because they ensure wh-phrases
25can receive the wide scope interpretation. The difference between wide and narrow scope is
exempliﬁed in (16). The sentence is ambiguous between two readings, one in which everyone
takes wide scope over which sandwich, and the other where it does not. The wide scope
reading gives rise to an interpretation where a respective sandwich is eaten by each individual.
In the narrow scope reading, everyone does not take scope over which sandwich, leading to a
reading where a single type of sandwich was eaten by each individual.
(16) Which sandwichi did everyone eat ti?
a. Wide Scope: Diego ate ham and cheese, Phoebe ate tuna, Jason ate a club.
b. Narrow Scope: Ham and cheese.
According to Kiss and de Swaart, WHI violations occur because the wh-word can not
receive the wide scope interpretation. Acceptable violations occur when words that do not
negate the scope-taking, so-called “harmless intervenors” (Szabolcsi & Zwarts, 1993), are
available. These harmless intervenors, usually verbs, allow for more acceptable violations.
Szabolcsi and Zwarts use this analysis to explain the variation in extractability in wh-words,
which provides a basis for referential DP arguments. They posit a hierarchy of wh-words,
provided in (17), based on how easily they extract from wh-islands (Szabolcsi & Zwarts, 1993,
p.249). Which-N is easier to extract than who, which is in turn easier to extract than the rest of
the hierarchy.
(17) which person(s) > who >what> who/what the hell > how, why
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) explain this hierarchy in terms of set range: words like which-
N can extract easily because they denote a set of unordered individuals. How and why gener-
ally do not denote individuals. They also often refer to ordered sets. For example, the phrase
how much money from the ungrammatical sentence in (18) below refers to the ordered set of
money.
26(18) *How much money was Diego wondering whether his roommate would gamble?
This results in a new characterization of WHI gradience based on the set a wh-word refers
to: rather than “speciﬁc members of a preestablished set” (Cinque, 1990), the set is further
constrained to contain unordered individuals. This does not yet explain why unordered sets of
individuals are easier to extract. Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) provide a somewhat cognitive
explanation: they claim a wh-word that denotes a set of unordered individuals makes for faster
lookup of that set. For example, the term which sandwich refers to an unordered set; using
the wh-word, even when it is ungrammatical, helps the listener ﬁgure out the unordered set
of sandwiches being asked about. This is not useful for other wh-words because they denote
more ordered sets. In this case, extraction is not worth the violation.
There are other semantic accounts of island violations, most notably those of Kroch (1989)
and Comorovski (1989) based on the plausibility of the presuppositions of sentences con-
taining violations. However, these approaches have the same limitation: they can only explain
gradience on the basis of unspeciﬁc claims of cognitive effects. The next subsection discusses
this issue further.
2.6 Limitations of linguisic explanations
The previous subsection demonstrated a few linguistic accounts of WHI violation acceptabil-
ity. However, they could only explain the variation in terms of the acceptability of which-N
constructions; none could describe the naturally-occurring evidence reported in (12) and (13).
Although this limitation is a problem, proponents of reductionist explanations of locality refer
to a more striking limitation: competence can not motivate why gradience should exist at all.
Hofmeister (2007), following Chung (1994), explains the issue as follows:
27...underlying all these observations is the question of why the content (or amount
of content) in the extracted element should alter acceptability, especially given
that this contrast appears most strikingly in the context of supposedly universal
syntactic constraints. (Hofmeister, 2007, p.2)
The limitation of the competence perspective is that it does not easily handle gradience.
Addendums and restrictions to universal claims can lead researchers to claim the original
constraints are “ad hoc and without independent motivation” (Hofmeister et al., 2007, p.187).
This criticism poses a problem for any competence-based explanation of gradience in syn-
tactic locality. The grammatical constraints can explain why island violations are ungram-
matical, but they can not easily explain exceptions to these constraints. Linguistic theories
spanning syntax, semantics, and pragmatics can account for the gradience, but they can not
explain why the gradience exists in the ﬁrst place. If the gradience, and syntactic locality it-
self, can be explained by general cognitive constraints, the grammar can be simpliﬁed. This
position is put to the test by the cognitive model considered here.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of syntactic locality from a linguistic perspective. The focus
is theories that provide a deeper understanding of locality principles, and can help challenge
reductionist assumptions. However, as the last section highlights, a reductionist analysis could
simplify the grammar and provide a natural explanation for the gradience in violations that is




The last chapter highlights several characteristics that promote syntactic locality’s status as
an important topic in linguistics. Some, like gradience, make islands and SUVs particularly
suitable for a cognitive approach. This would not only offer a language-independent expla-
nation, but also simplify the grammar. This reductionist approach to syntactic locality “re-
duces” the role of the grammar and uses processing factors to account for the difﬁculty (Fodor,
1978; Deane, 1991; Pritchett, 1992; Kluender, 1992; Kluender & Kutas, 1993; Kluender, 1998;
Hawkins, 1999; Arnon et al., To Appear; Hofmeister, 2007; Hofmeister et al., 2007; Hofmeis-
ter & Sag, 2010). Yet, it is equally possible that this gradience in acceptability judgments
comes from grammatical illusions (Phillips, In Press), and many experiments do not address
this concern.
A computational model has the potential to address concerns against reductionism by
explicitly deﬁning cognitive explanations and testing them against the experimental data on
syntactic locality. In the process, the computational model can either bolster or detract from
reductionist accounts by addressing two important questions: does gradience fall out naturally
from independently-motivated cognitive principles? And if so, do these cognitive principles
accurately model human difﬁculty?
This chapter discusses the cognitive principles that support reductionist arguments for syn-
tactic locality. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 discuss the role of working memory, and more
speciﬁcally activation and interference, in processing difﬁculty. Section 3.4 discusses speciﬁc
activation, interference, and combination theories that have the potential to model syntactic
locality.
293.2 Working memory in sentence processing
Working memory maintains the words, structures, and other information necessary to build an
analysis as a sentence is parsed. But, it has a well-known limited capacity (Miller, 1956) which
can lead to processing difﬁculty (Yngve, 1960; Lewis, 1996).
Psycholinguists usually separate working memory constraints into two categories: storage
costs and processing or integration costs. Storage costs calculate the cost of maintaining
a word, or in many cases an incomplete dependency, in memory (Kimball, 1973; Hakuta,
1981; Gibson, 1991; Lewis, 1993; Stabler, 1994; Gibson, 1998, 2000; Schuler et al., 2010).
Processing and integration costs, on the other hand, are concerned with the cost of integrating
a word into an analysis (Pickering, Barton, & Shillcock, 1994; Gibson, 1998, 2000; Lewis,
1999; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005).
The majority of the theories this work considers focus on integration costs because syntac-
tic locality difﬁculty arises at the head of the wh-word (Stowe, 1986; Arnon et al., To Appear;
Hofmeister & Sag, 2010). Experiments that use word-based measures, such as reading times,
measure difﬁculty at the embedded verb, which would be ﬁre in Figure 3.1. This is the integra-
tion site: where the long-distance dependency between the wh-word and its head is created. It
is here that one would expect to see difﬁculty caused by memory decay and interference from
other words, the two quantities most implicated in reductionist accounts of syntactic locality.

















Figure 3.1: The integration site for the long-distance dependency is at ﬁred.
303.3 Activation and Interference
The cost of integrating an item into an analysis can be high for various reasons, but the most
interesting for syntactic locality has to do with inaccessibility1. While parsing a non-local de-
pendency, for example the sentence in Figure 3.1, retrieving the wh-word and integrating it
with the verb is difﬁcult. There are two potential causes: the difﬁculty is because the word
hasn’t been accessed for a long time, or it is because there are other words in the sentence
that interfere with it.
The ﬁrst problem is one of activation (Brown, 1958), where an item decays in memory the
longer it remains unused. Using the example sentence in Figure 3.1, the wh-word hasn’t been
accessed in memory for a long time. If it were the head of some other word in memory, it may
have been reactivated and easier to access. But as it stands, the word is not needed until its
head is parsed, which is seven words later in the sentence.
The WHI example demonstrates another possible cause of the difﬁculty, interference with
other material (Lewis, 1996, 1999; Caplan & Waters, 1999; Gordon, Hendrick, & Johnson,
2001; Gordon, Hendrick, & Levine, 2002). The word who in Figure 3.1 has several features,
one of which likely encodes the fact that it is a question word. If there are other question
words in the sentence, as there are here, they would all share this feature, and would all
likely be activated should a word be a suitable head. This leads to interference because in an
associative memory, where words are accessed based on their features, it is difﬁcult to access
the correct wh-word (McElree, Foraker, & Dyer, 2003).
While activation and interference are relatively uncontroversial costs for working memory,
it is not always possible to implicate one over the other (Anderson, 2002). A variety of theories
posit how activation and interference affect sentence processing. The next section surveys the
1Another integration cost may come from expectation: the parser expects a certain word or type of word, but
instead receives another. Chapter 4.6.1 discusses how the use of surprisal (Hale, 2001) as a complexity metric
can help model this particular cost
31theories that can explain syntactic locality difﬁculty.
3.4 Implemented theories
Reductionist accounts argue that what appear to be grammatical locality violations are in fact
sentences with severe processing difﬁculty. Gradience in locality difﬁculty then naturally falls
out from the cognitive approach: it is the result of alleviating difﬁculty. (19) lists a series of
constraints that have the potential to explain locality processing difﬁculty and gradience, along
with references citing their use in sentence processing. Many have been argued to affect
locality constraints in particular (Hofmeister & Sag, 2010).
(19) Distance: Wanner and Maratsos (1978); Joshi (1990); Rambow and Joshi (1994); Hawkins
(1990).
Activation: Deane (1991); Just and Carpenter (1992); Vosse and Kempen (2000); Just and
Varma (2002); Lewis and Vasishth (2005).
Filler Load: McElree et al. (2003); Lewis and Vasishth (2005); Lewis, Vasishth, and Van Dyke
(2006); Hofmeister (2007).
Intervenor Load: Gibson (1991); McElree et al. (2003); Hofmeister (2007).
Interference: Lewis (1996, 1999); Vosse and Kempen (2000); Gordon et al. (2001, 2002);
Gordon, Hendrick, and Johnson (2004); Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson, and Lee (2006);
Van Dyke and Lewis (2003); Warren and Gibson (2002); Lewis and Vasishth (2005); Lewis
et al. (2006); Van Dyke and McElree (2006).
DLT Gibson (1998, 2000); Alexopoulou and Keller (2007); Demberg and Keller (2008); Demberg-
Winterfors (2010).
Retrieval Lewis and Vasishth (2005).
There are a few notable exceptions to this list. For example, Bourdages (1992) argues that
wrap-up effects are a key part of the difﬁculty in locality processing. Similarly, the difﬁculty in
identifying the head of a wh-word has long been considered a main cause of unacceptability
(Frazier, 1979; Fodor, 1979; Stowe, 1986; Pickering et al., 1994; Phillips, 2006). Each of these
constraints was tested in initial versions of this research and did not perform well against the
experimental data. This is likely due to a problem with the translation to probabilistic features,
32and the architectural constraints posed by the parser. These theories are also incorporated
into some of the higher level theories considered here, such as the DLT and retrieval. For this




Distance as measured by string position, or the number of words between a governor and a
dependent, has been argued to affect processing difﬁculty (Wanner & Maratsos, 1978; Joshi,
1990; Rambow & Joshi, 1994; Hawkins, 1990; Gibson, Pearlmutter, Canseco-Gonzalez, &
Hickok, 1996; Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Thomas, 1999; Gibson, 2000). The hypothesis is
that the further away a word is from its dependent, the more difﬁcult it will be to create the
dependency. Experimental results demonstrate that this has an effect on processing difﬁculty
(Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Pearlmutter, 1998; Hawkins, 1999; Gibson, 2000). However, it can
not explain all data. For example, many questions have long dependencies, but they are
easier to process than some shorter sentences. For this reason, a more sophisticated version
of activation is considered as well, decay.
Decay
Activation decay is sensitive to the decay that items held in memory are subject to, particularly
if they have not been accessed for a long time. Previous research has considered activation
of words and structures in memory, though most of this research focuses on connectionist and
neural network systems (Elman, 1990, 1991; Stevenson, 1994; Tabor, Juliano, & Tanenhaus,
331997; Christiansen & Chater, 1999). The implementation of decay that this work considers is
based on principles from the general cognitive framework ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought-
Rational) (Anderson, 1976; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2005), following work by
Lewis and Vasishth (2005). Here, an item in memory becomes less active (i.e., decays) as
time passes in a sentence. If the word is used again, for example if it is required to build some
sub-structure, it can be reactivated and is therefore easier to retrieve later in the sentence.
The precise equations that calculate a word’s decay, as well as how they are translated into a
retrieval time, are discussed further in Section 3.4.3 and Chapter 4.6.2.
3.4.2 Interference theories
Filler load
Linguists have long argued that certain types of wh-words are more acceptable for extraction
than others (see Section 2.5 for details). One possible psycholinguistic explanation for this
variation is termed ﬁller load, where ﬁller refers to the extracted element. Rather than basing
the variation on referentiality or semantic properties, the psycholinguistic arguments are based
on how easy it is to retrieve a ﬁller from memory.
Experimental evidence for this variation is provided by Hofmeister (2007), repeated below
in (20). The WHI violation in (20a) is the most difﬁcult sentence, and the non-island in (20c) is
the easiest. The which-N condition in (20b) falls in between.
(20) a. Who did Albert learn whether they dismissed after the annual performance review?
b. Which employee did Albert learn whether they dismissed after the annual perfor-
mance review?
c. Who did Albert learn that they dismissed after the annual performance review?
34Hofmeister explains this variation in terms of ﬁller load: more informative ﬁllers, like (20b),
decrease processing difﬁculty because they have more features in memory. For example,
which employee is more informative than who; it therefore has more features in memory
than who. When the processor is trying to retrieve the wh-word from memory, it is easier
to remember a word with more features than one with less (McElree et al., 2003; Lewis &
Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006). Therefore, the type of ﬁller has an effect on how difﬁcult it
is to process the wh-word.
Intervenor load
One of the most prominent theories in psycholinguistics, the Dependency Locality Theory
(DLT) (Gibson, 1998, 2000), bases memory difﬁculty on the number of unresolved discourse
referents. Gibson uses this measure because psycholinguistic results suggest that the types of
words intervening between a dependency affect its processing. In other words, a parsed word
that requires a lot of memory may contribute to processing difﬁculty as syntactic relations are
built, even if these relations do not involve the word. This provides an argument for intervenor
load being a source of processing difﬁculty.
The intervenor load can be determined in various ways. Following Gundel, Hedberg, and
Zacharski (1993), Gibson (1998) argues for an Accessibility Hierarchy of discourse refer-
ents. There are a variety of ways to refer to people in a discourse. They can be referred to
as indexical pronouns (you), short names (Luke), full noun phrases (the doctor), or referent
pronouns (they). Each of these is demonstrated in the sentences in (21) from Gibson’s ex-
perimental conditions. In the conditions, the discourse referents intervene in the dependency
between student and copied.
(21) a. The student who the professor who I collaborated with had advised copied the
article.
35b. The student who the professor who Jen collaborated with had advised copied the
article.
c. The student who the professor who the scientist collaborated with had advised
copied the article.
d. The student who the professor who they collaborated with had advised copied the
article.
Using acceptability judgments, Gibson found that the indexical pronouns, (21a), are “signiﬁ-
cantly easier to process than any of the other three conditions” (Gibson, 1998, p.18).
Although this experiment does not involve locality data, Hofmeister (2007) argues that
intervenor load affects locality processing. This cognitive constraint would explain gradience
because intervenors that are more accessible, in terms of Gibson’s hierarchy, are easier to
process. Because they’re easier to process, they interfere less with the dependency between
a wh-word and its governor, leading to more acceptable judgments.
Interference effects
It can be difﬁcult to differentiate the memory-based constraints posited in the literature. DLT
includes a measure of intervenor difﬁculty which is different from intervenor load; both have
something to do with interfering with dependencies, but do not specify how. These constraints
are in fact related, but they are sensitive to different aspects of memory. The DLT is a calcu-
lation, or metric, of intervenor load that relates to memory difﬁculty. Intervenor load speciﬁes
that some words are just more difﬁcult as intervenors, and is sensitive to these words. And in-
terference effects arise when words, regardless of whether they are discourse referents, cause
difﬁculty because they share the same features as other words (McElree et al., 2003; Lewis &
Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006).
36In the case of syntactic locality, a word that shares the same syntactic, lexical, or semantic
features as the wh-word would add processing difﬁculty during parsing. This has been argued
to be a possible cognitive factor in syntactic locality difﬁculty (Hofmeister et al., 2007). This hy-
pothesis has not been explicitly tested against locality data, although there is ample evidence
of interference effects in other domains of processing (Gordon et al., 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006;
Van Dyke & Lewis, 2003; Warren & Gibson, 2002; Lewis et al., 2006; Van Dyke & McElree,
2006).
In this work, interference is encoded as both a soft constraint in the parser, as the other
cognitive constraints presented in this section, and as part of a complexity metric, retrieval. For
both, interference is calculated as similarity-based interference (SBI), a quantity based on the
diminished activation a word has if there are other similar words in the sentence (Anderson,
1976; Lewis, 1999; Anderson, 2005; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). This hypothesis will likely be
most important for sentences that have multiple wh-words, like WHIs and SUVs, and less
important for those that do not.
3.4.3 Combination theories
DLT
The DLT (Gibson, 1998, 2000) links a preference for local attachments (i.e., activation) and
integration costs (i.e., interference) into a proliﬁc complexity metric for sentence processing.
The hypothesis is given in (22).
(22) “The structural integration complexity depends on the distance or locality2 between the
2Gibson employs the term locality to mean linear distance. This is different from the original notion of syntactic
locality that is used as a cover-term for such things as island phenomena in linguistics. The linguistic version refers
to structural distance. Though roughly related, the two terms do not refer to the same thing. In this dissertation,
the term locality refers to the syntactic deﬁnition of locality.
37two elements being integrated” (Gibson, 2000, p.102).
Although the DLT refers to the distance between words, this distance is not measured by
string position. Rather, it is measured in terms of the number of discourse referents introduced
between a dependent and its governor. For example, in the sentences provided in (23) through
(25), the nurse and the administrator are new discourse referents. They therefore increase the
DLT integration cost of attaching nurse as a dependent of a later verb. This DLT cost at each






















































Note that the cost of new discourse referents can be thought of as a storage cost: the DLT
measure goes up once the discourse referent is introduced, and is unloaded after it has found
its head. However, this work only considers difﬁculty at the head of the verb, which translates
to retrieval difﬁculty. Although the DLT combines the two, it is encoded as a retrieval metric.
Retrieval
The most complete model of integration effects in language is provided by the retrieval theory
(Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). Retrieval is sensitive to both activation and interference, but unlike
many sentence processing models, it is based on general cognitive principles. Lewis and
Vasishth (2005) build upon the ACT-R framework, a hybrid model featuring both a symbolic
38and subsymbolic (or connectionist) component. At the lower level, a series of mathematical
equations calculate the difﬁculty imposed by activation and interference during processing. At
the higher level, a production system determines what has to be retrieved from memory, and
integrates new words with the structure being built. ACT-R is a full cognitive framework; it
has been applied to complex human behavior such as problem solving, learning, individual
differences, and attention.
Lewis and Vasishth (2005) apply this cognitive framework to language, speciﬁcally sen-
tence processing. They build a production system for sentences, and use the same subsym-
bolic equations for activation and interference used in other ACT-R models to determine the
amount of time it takes to retrieve items from memory. The system includes predictions for how
long it takes to do other language-related tasks (for example, decide to retrieve an item from
memory, and build an analysis), and the end result is a prediction in milliseconds for how long
it takes to read a sentence. Their model offers a concise memory-related complexity metric
that can be used for comparison to human data, and results indicate it is a successful model
of human difﬁculty (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006; Vasishth, Br¨ ussow, Lewis, &
Drenhaus, 2008; Boston, Hale, Vasishth, & Kliegl, 2011).
Because of its combination of activation and interference quantities, retrieval has been
argued to be an accurate model of syntactic locality by other researchers (Hofmeister & Sag,
2010). This work is the ﬁrst test of this prediction. Chapter 4 provides details on how the theory
is implemented in this parser, both as a probabilistic feature and as a complexity metric akin
to the original Lewis and Vasishth model.
393.5 Conclusion
This chapter highlights working memory constraints that can explain syntactic locality from a
cognitive perspective. Many of these constraints have a long tradition in psycholinguistics,
and are at the heart of many theories. This research encodes the sentence processing theo-
ries that have the best potential to explain syntactic locality, and then tests them against the




This chapter discusses the implementation of a non-projective dependency parser as a cogni-
tive model of syntactic locality. Although the parser is the central component of the cognitive
model, the implementation includes many tools and processes, as Figure 4.1 demonstrates.
These processes address peripheral considerations for determining how well cognitive con-
straints explain syntactic locality. For example, the model has to incorporate probabilities from
treebanks in four different languages (steps 1 through 4 , discussed in Section 4.4). It
also has to convert cognitive theories into these probabilistic features to inform parser deci-
sion (steps 5 through 9 , discussed in Section 4.5), and derive parser difﬁculty measures
over these features (steps 10 and 11 , discussed in Section 4.6). Section 4.7 discusses
a tendency for longer dependencies to be more difﬁcult, and how this can be over-ridden in
the parser. A cognitive model must have a method for determining parser accuracy, which is
detailed in Section 4.8. Before discussion of each of these crucial implementation features
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5   almost      RB                    6
6   nothing    NN                    7
7   rates        VBZ                   0
8   higher      JJR                   7
9   than         IN                       8
10 what        WP-WHAT     15
11 the           DT                    13
12 movie      NN                   13
13 men         NNS                 14











Distance-1  Yes        No        No        No
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Distance-2  Yes        No        No        No
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Distance-1  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-2  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-3  No         No        Yes       No
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Distance-1  0.4        0.26      0.3     0.04
Distance-2  0.5        0.12      0.16   0.22
Distance-3  0.23      0.28      0.36   0.13
Distance-4  0.28      0.36      0.13   0.23
Distance-5  0.26      0.04      0.4     0.3
Distance-6  0.01      0.82      0.1     0.03





I saw who Emma doubted reports that..
I saw which employee Emma doubted...
I saw who Emma doubted a report...
Experimental Difficulty
I                             56ms
saw                       92ms
who                      102ms
Emma                  98ms
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Retrieval
I                             51ms
saw                       182ms
who                       51ms








Figure 4.1: The parts of a cognitive model.
424.2 Why a dependency parser?
There are several language models that could have been used for this research, many already
implemented. Instead, this work implements a non-projective, transition-based parser operat-
ing on dependency grammar. The following subsections outline the suitability of this type of
parser to address these research questions.
4.2.1 Why dependency grammar?
Most grammar-based human sentence processing models use context-free grammars (CFG)
or grammars that follow from that tradition because they are well-supported in computational
linguistics (Roark, 2001; Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008)1. A variety of algorithms provide good perfor-
mance, and the context-free grammar provides adequate coverage for many psycholinguistic
phenomena. Human sentence processing models that depart from this tradition gravitate to-
wards more restrictive mildly context-sensitive (MCSG) formalisms that are in keeping with
human grammar abilities (Hale, 2003; Demberg-Winterfors, 2010; Grove, 2011).
This parser instead uses dependency grammar, a formalism that is too simple to ade-
quately model the mildly context-sensitive nature of human grammar. Because dependency
grammar relies solely on word-to-word dependencies, it does not model the hierarchy and
constituency available in acceptable sentences. Chapter 2 provides more details on the limita-
tions of dependency grammar; this section details several advantages it provides for cognitive
modeling.
The ﬁrst advantage is that dependency grammar avoids linguistic controversies. Although
MCSGs are mathematically equivalent, they are descriptively different in terms of how they
1There is also a class of human sentence-processing models that do not use grammars at all, such as those
based on neural networks (Elman, 1990, 1991; Tabor et al., 1997; Tabor & Tanenhaus, 1999; Christiansen &
Chater, 1999). This discussion focuses on symbolic models.
43analyze linguistic sentences. But, the notion of dependency is inherent within CFG and all
mildly context-sensitive formalisms, a fact formalized by the dependency-generative nature of
grammars (Kuhlmann, 2007). Dependency grammar therefore takes into account an aspect of
grammatical analysis that everyone agrees is a part of grammar; it avoids the more controver-
sial question of what else is required.
Dependency grammar provides another advantage for cognitive models: simplicity of de-
sign. One can readily see what each parser state holds within the Nivre transition system,
and can analyze the respective contributions of particular analyses without the complications
that a more complex grammar, and hence more complex parser, would have. This level of
explicitness in the model allows for an easy examination of the contributions of the different
cognitive hypotheses in explaining syntactic locality.
Finally, previous work with this dependency parser indicates that a parser based on depen-
dency grammar is adequate in modeling psycholinguistic difﬁculty (Boston, Hale, Patil, Kliegl,
& Vasishth, 2008; Boston et al., 2011). Boston et al., 2011 demonstrate that surprisal and
retrieval values from this parsing model predict ﬁxation durations in a German eye-movement
corpus, indicating that the parser models sentence processing difﬁculty. This research also
demonstrates that dependency grammar can model aspects of difﬁculty that a CFG parser
can not: Boston et al., 2008 compare surprisal values from this parsing model to surprisal
values from a PCFG (probabilistic CFG) parser (Levy, 2008) on the same German corpus.
Results demonstrate that the dependency model accounts for different types of difﬁculty than
the PCFG model. Finally, Buch-Kromann, 2006 discusses a psycholinguistically-motivated
version of dependency grammar, which may be turned into a promising model.
There are a variety of practical reasons for choosing a parser based on dependency gram-
mar, ranging from simplicity to state-of-the-art performance in standard NLP tasks. Previous
research that demonstrates the adequacy of dependency grammar in modeling human sen-
tence processing, as well as its ability to model differently from CFG parsers, helped to solidify
44the decision to continue development with dependency grammar for this research.
4.2.2 Why the Nivre transition system?
Although dependency parsing has a long tradition in computational linguistics (Hays, 1964;
Milward, 1994; Eisner, 1996b), interest within the NLP community grew once parsers us-
ing this simple grammar delivered state-of-the-art parsing accuracy (Yamada & Matsumoto,
2003). This resurgence gave rise to a variety of methods for dependency parsing. Some, like
the graph-based parsing techniques of the MST parser (McDonald, Pereira, Ribarov, & Hajiˆ c,
2005) and the k-best Maximum Spanning Tree parser (Hall, 2007; Hall, Havelka, & Smith,
2007) can not be used as psycholinguistic models because they are not incremental: they
build dependencies by taking into account the entire sentence.
That leaves grammar-based and transition-based dependency parsers. Grammar-based
parsers work on an explicitly-deﬁned grammar, and operate similarly to standard CFG parsers
by using the same algorithms, such as the Cocke-Kasami-Younger (CKY) and Earley parsing
algorithms (Earley, 1970; Eisner, 1996b, 2000). They include the pioneering work of Hays,
1964 as well as over a decade of work by Eisner and his research group(Eisner, 1996b, 1996a,
2000; Eisner & Smith, 2005, 2010). A grammar-based dependency parser could have worked
well as a cognitive model, particularly because of its similarity to the CFG parsers often used
as human sentence processing models.
Instead, this work develops a transition-based parser that follows from the language mod-
eling traditions of the 1970s and 1980s (Kaplan, 1972; Kimball, 1973; Marcus, 1980; Berwick
& Weinberg, 1984). There have been a variety of transition-based dependency parsers de-
veloped: Yamada and Matsumoto (2003) provide an arc-standard algorithm that provided the
state-of-the-art parsing accuracy results for English, and Attardi (2006) created an incremental,
45non-projective parser from this model. Covington (2001) highlights a variety of transition-based
algorithms for dependency parsing as well.
Although many of these grammar-based and transition-based dependency parsers can be
adequate models of human sentence processing, this work uses the transition system deﬁned
by Nivre (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009). The original decision to work with the Nivre transition
system as a parsing model was based on its simplicity and its incrementality: Nivre’s interest
in human sentence processing contributes to the parser’s adaptability to modeling psycholin-
guistic data. Further, previous research demonstrates its potential for modeling difﬁcult and
psycholinguistically-interesting sentences (Boston et al., 2008, 2011).
Nivre and his research group have implemented this transition system as the MaltParser,
which provides state-of-the-art results in dependency parsing shared tasks (Nivre et al., 2007).
One possible research direction would have been to use the MaltParser for modeling syntac-
tic locality because of its high level of accuracy. But, this implementation was created and
extended for several reasons. First, this model is demonstrably useful in psycholinguistic
modeling despite its lower accuracy. Further, the MaltParser is tuned for accuracy in pars-
ing standard corpora. Although it can be used incrementally for human sentence processing
modeling, it is unclear how many of these tweaks make assumptions that go against human
sentence processing theory. Finally, it would be difﬁcult if not impossible to get word-by-word
complexity metrics like surprisal and retrieval scores from the MaltParser because of the way
it has been implemented.
4.2.3 Why a non-projective model?
One advantage of using DG for linguistic analysis is that it allows for non-projective struc-
tures, or sentences with crossing dependencies. Non-projective structures are often difﬁcult
46for other formalisms, but DG allows word-to-word dependencies anywhere in the sentence.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of an English sentence that has these crossing dependencies
(Nivre, 2008). The head hearing is discontinuous from its dependent on the issue. The word
scheduled intervenes, even though scheduled is not itself a dependent of hearing. Similarly,
the dependency between scheduled and today is discontinous because it is interrupted by the
phrase on the issue. These discontinuous dependencies give rise to what looks like crossing
dependencies in the arcs, which can be very difﬁcult to analyze with rewriting rules. This is

















Figure 4.2: A non-projective analysis of an English sentence.
Non-projective sentences have a greater potential for ambiguity than projective sentences
because of this discontinuity (Satta, 1992): if all the dependents of a head were required to
be adjacent to the head or its dependents (i.e., continuous), the number of potential heads
for a dependent is much smaller. If, on the other hand, dependents need not be adjacent to
their heads, the number of potential heads for a word increases, as does the search space.
Projective dependency parsing can be done in linear time, or contingent directly on the number
of words that are in the sentence. Non-projective dependency parsing, on the other hand, can
in the worst case take twice as long as the number of words in the sentence (Covington, 2001).
This does not bode well for a cognitive model, as we know that humans are able to understand
language in linear, not exponential time.
The original Nivre transition system is limited in that it can only parse projective structures
(Nivre, 2004). This allows it to parse sentences in linear time, as a human would, but it also
means that the parser can not model sentences like the one in Figure 4.2. This is a prob-
lem for the research planned here because some experimental sentences are non-projective,
as demonstrated by CNP example from the Hofmeister and Sag (2010) experiment in Fig-
































Figure 4.3: A non-projective experimental sentence.
It is therefore necessary to build a parser that can handle non-projective structures, even
if the parser will not be able to parse in linear time. For the Nivre transition system, there are
two possibilities: pseudo-projective parsing (Nivre & Nilsson, 2005) combines a dependency-
changing “lift” operation (Kahane, Nasr, & Rambow, 1998) with post-processing to turn non-
projective structures into projective structures and then back again. The idea behind pseudo-
projective parsing is that the arc that causes the non-projective analysis (i.e., the crossing
dependency) is lifted along its ancestors until it is projective. In other words, the child node
becomes a dependent of the grandparent, the great-grandparent, etc., successively until it is
part of a continuous dependency.
Although this change creates a projective structure from the non-projective sentence, the
linguistic analysis has changed. In Figure 4.3 who would successively become the depen-
dent of had, that and doubted before it would be projective. This is a problem for cognitive
theories like retrieval, which depend on the difﬁculty in building analyses based on how far
apart two words are. Although a post-process turns the projective sentence into the original
non-projective sentence, at parse-time retrieval for who would be relatively simple because
doubted is the next word.
Pseudo-projective parsing is therefore not the best way to model non-projective experi-
mental sentences cognitively. That leaves Nivre’s non-projective transition system, which will
48be described in the next section.
4.3 The Nivre non-projective transition system as a cognitive model
Nivre (2004, 2006) deﬁnes a state transition system for incremental dependency parsing,
which he later extends for non-projective parsing Nivre (2008, 2009). This cognitive model
is based on the non-projective system.
Nivre deﬁnes each parser state as consisting of a tuple, in (26).
(26) state = (; B;A)
 consists of a stack of already-parsed words that still require heads or dependents. B is a
buffer of upcoming words, and A holds the dependency analysis information. The transition
system handles non-projective analyses by allowing already-parsed words to be pushed back
onto the buffer B so that the sentence can be reordered and attachments can be made locally.
One problem with this system, from a cognitive model perspective, is that buffered, already-
parsed and unparsed words are held in one data structure, B, which could lead to problems
for incrementality. For example, the parser should be blind to any words that haven’t been
parsed yet, but already-parsed words should be available. A data structure is therefore added
to Nivre’s tuple, T, as in (27). Following Nivre (2004), T holds all words that have not yet been
parsed. B only holds words that have been taken off the stack for reordering.
(27) state = (; B;T;A)
To transition from one state to the next, Nivre deﬁnes four actions: Left-Arc, Right-Arc,
49Shift, and Swap. Aside from the distinction between Shift and Shift, the deﬁnitions in
Table 4.1 are directly from Nivre (2009, p.353). Following his conventions, ’s top appears on
the right and B and T’s tops appear on the left. Dependencies can be formed only between the
Transition Deﬁnition Condition
Left-Arc ([ji; j]; B;T;A) ) ([jj]; B;T;A [ f(j;i)g) i , 0
Right-Arc ([ji; j]; B;T;A) ) ([ji]; B;T;A [ f(i; j)g)
Shift (;[ij];T;A) ) ([ji];;T;A)  , ;
Shift (; B;[ij];A) ) ([ji]; B;;A)  , ;
Swap ([ji; j];;T;A) ) ([jj];[ij];T;A) 0 < i < j
Table 4.1: Transitions for the Nivre non-projective transition system, where  is the stack mem-
ory, B is the buffer for swapped elements, T is the input list, and A holds the depen-
dency analysis so far.
two top elements in the stack, 1 and 2. For Left-Arc transitions, 1, or j, becomes the head
of 2, i, and i is removed from the stack. For Right-Arc transitions, the opposite occurs: 1,
or j, becomes the dependent of 2, i, and j is removed from the stack. In the implementation,
Shift is one action: until  is empty, Shift pops elements off of  and pushes them onto .
Once  is empty, Shift pops elements off of . In this way, the extra data structure does not
change the way the parser itself works.
Finally, the Swap action is what gives this parser its ability to handle non-projective struc-
tures. Essentially, Swap reorders elements so that two discontinuous elements can be side-
by-side in the stack as 1 and 2. Swap pops 2, in this case i, off of  and pushes it onto .
This allows a new word, originally 3, to be available for dependencies with 1. Additionally,
this reorders the sentence: if 2 is pushed back onto the stack, the two words are inverted.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates how these parser actions work on an experimental sentence.
The diagram shows the sequence of parser actions required to parse the CNP example
sentence in Figure 4.3. The diagram zooms in on the states required to parse the word cap-
tured. The left portion of the diagram shows the , , and  data structures, and the right por-
tion shows the dependency analysis in A. Words already deleted from the stack are marked
50in gray; these are words that require no further parsing. The current top stack elements are
marked in bold. A Shift action brings captured onto the stack . Although there is a depen-
dency between had and captured, this dependency can not be created yet because captured
has not yet found all of its dependents. In particular, it needs to attach the extracted wh-word
who from the beginning of the sentence. In order to get to who, which is further down on the
stack, a sequence of Swap transitions need to take place.
Captured is ﬁrst swapped with had, then that, and then doubted. Notice that with each
swap, the swapped word (marked in green) is pushed onto  until captured and who are 1
and 2 respectively. At this point, a Left-Arc transition occurs, connecting who to captured.
Although the sentence can remain in this order in an NLP model, a cognitive model requires
as much of the original input as possible. Therefore, once the non-projective dependency has
been made, a series of Shift and Swap transitions reorder the sentence to its original order.
This is done after every non-projective dependency; although this increases the parse time
for the sentence, it ensures that measures like distance and activation remain as they do for
humans.
This parser keeps with the Nivre transition system as much as possible, which has a worst-
case time complexity of O(n2) for his transition system. Although the additional re-ordering
after each non-projective sentence adds to this time complexity, the additional time is linear:
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Figure 4.4: An example parse of a CNP experimental sentence.
524.4 The oracle
But how does the parser know which actions to take to create the correct dependency analy-
sis? Nivre (2009) calls this function the oracle: given a parser state, it provides a transition to
a subsequent parser state. Developing the oracle forms a large part of the cognitive model, as
can be seen in the parsing diagram provided at the beginning of the chapter, and repeated in
Figure 4.5. This section explains steps 1 through 9 in the diagram. Section 4.4.1 and Sec-
tion 4.4.2 describes the treebanks used to deﬁne a probabilistic grammar, and transformations
to the treebank that are required to provide sensitivity to syntactic locality phenomena. Sec-
tion 4.4.3 describes how these treebanks are then converted into state-action banks, providing
a sequence of parser states and actions for each sentence in the treebanks. Section 4.4.4 and
Section 4.4.5 then discuss how the state-action banks are converted into probabilistic features
that are used in the parser.
4.4.1 Treebanks
The syntactic locality experimental data is in four languages: English, German, Swedish, and
Russian. The model therefore requires dependency treebanks in each of these languages to
inform parser decisions. These treebanks are listed in Table 4.2.
Name Language Sentences Text type Format Projectivity
Brown English 19,395 Balanced CFG Projective
Negra German 20,602 Newspaper CFG Non-projective
Talbanken05 Swedish 8,834 Newspaper Dependency Non-projective
SynTagRus Russian 32,950 Balanced Dependency Non-projective
Table 4.2: These treebanks inform parser probabilities.
In two of the languages, Swedish and Russian, dependency treebanks already exist. For
Swedish, a portion of the Swedish Talbanken 2005 (Nivre, Nilsson, & Hall, 2006) which had
53been prepared for a CoNLL (Computational Natural Language Learning Conference) shared
task is used. This data was already in the useful CoNLL format, which is used as a base
format for all dependency treebanks for the parser. Table 4.3 shows an example of this format.
The crucial information for this task is the word, its position, its part-of-speech (POS), and the
position of its head. The Russian SynTagRus corpus (Nivre, Boguslavsky, & Iomdin, 2008) is
also a dependency corpus, and it had been formatted for a CoNLL shared-task as well.
ID Form Lemma Coarse POS POS Features Head Dependency Relation Projective Head Label
1 In IN 7 ADV
2 American JJ 3 NMOD
3 romance NN 1 PMOD
4 , , 7 P
5 almost RB 6 NMOD
6 nothing NN 7 SBJ
7 rates VBZ 0 ROOT
8 higher JJR 7 OPRD
Table 4.3: Fragment of a Brown sentence in CoNLL format.
The Brown (Francis & Kucera, 1979) and Negra treebanks (Brants et al., 2004) inform En-
glish and German transitions. Both are large-scale treebanks often used in broad-coverage
parsing. Whereas the Brown corpus is balanced, containing sentences from a variety of me-
dia, including newspapers, novels, and magazines on a variety of topics, the Negra treebank
contains only newspaper text. It was chosen because it is the most freely-available large-scale
German treebank.
Both the Brown and Negra treebanks are converted from CFG format to DG format with
headﬁnder tools. Headﬁnder tools provide a list of ”main children” for each node in a CFG tree.
The lists are ordered so that the main child will be the ﬁrst in the list to be found within that
node. (28) shows an example from Dubey’s headﬁnder tool for Negra (2004). The head of an
S node (and hence the root of a sentence) will be the ﬁrst verb found, with ﬁnite verbs (VVFIN)
preferred. If no verbs are available before a verb phrase is encountered (VP), then the head
will be the head of that verb phrase, and so on.
54(28) “S”![ “VVFIN”; “VMFIN”; “VAFIN”; “VVIMP”; “VAIMP”; “VMPP”; “VVPP”;“VP”; “CVP”;
“S”; “CS”; “VVINF”; “VAIMP”; “NP”; “PP” ];
This work uses Dubey’s headﬁnder rules in a conversion tool that creates dependencies for
Negra. For Brown, the freely-available pennconverter (Johansson & Nugues, 2007) is used.
4.4.2 1  and 2 : Treebank transformations
There are two main differences between the experimental data and the treebanks. First, the
experimental data is non-projective, whereas some of the treebanks, like Brown, are projective.
Secondly, the experimental data includes island violations, whereas the treebanks themselves
have very few island violations2. The Swedish Talbanken includes eight WHI violations, which
is the most of any treebank. Although there are more examples of CNP violations across
languages (Swedish has 30, Russian has 8, English has 3, and German has 1), they are
too infrequent to effect probabilities. Some amount of the probability mass, though, must be
allotted to island-violating and non-projective contexts.
Therefore, the data is transformed to create island violations in the treebanks, shown in 1
in the diagram. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd examples of relative clauses for CNPs and complement
clauses headed by whether for WHIs in the treebanks. The second step is to search for a
preceding wh-word in the sentence and change that wh-word’s dependency to the embedded
verb within the relative/complement clause. This not only creates an island-violating context,
but it also often creates non-projective sentences, necessary for Brown. These new sentences
provide probabilities that allow the parser to consider island violations.
Many of the experiments for syntactic locality differentiate the speciﬁcity of the wh-word.
2SUVs are difﬁcult to ﬁnd because the parser is unlexicalized and unlabeled: for the parser, any two wh-word
dependents of a later verb forms an SUV.
55For example, in English, what and which share a POS tag, WDT. But, experimental evidence
suggests that what and which-noun have different acceptability in an SUV context (Arnon et
al., To Appear; Fedorenko & Gibson, Submitted). To differentiate the words in the POS-based
parser, the POS tags for all wh-words were changed in each language, as Table 4.4 shows.
The island-violation and POS transformations provide the necessary data to make the
parser sensitive to both islands and wh-word speciﬁcity. The result of these two transforma-
tions on the four raw treebanks are the base-level dependency treebanks in 2 .
4.4.3 3  and 4 : From treebanks to state-action banks
Unlike grammar-based parsers, transition-based parsers do not base probabilities on the
grammar itself. Rather, they base probabilities on state-action pairs. Therefore, each of the
treebanks are converted to sequences of state and action pairs for each sentence. Con-
llToConﬁgMaker implements this converter, which takes in treebanks in CoNLL format and
provides treebanks in Nivre conﬁguration (or state) format. For each sentence, the sequence
of parser states necessary to build the correct dependency analysis is listed, as well as the
correct actions to take to get to the next parser state. This treebank of state-action pairs is
then used to train probabilistic features, discussed in the next section.
4.4.4 5  and 6 : From state-action banks to feature banks
The state-and-action banks contain all the information in each parser state: all the words in
the stack, all the words in the buffer, all the dependency analyses created. One problem is
that to generalize from the treebank data to the experimental data at test time, this is too much
information; it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd within the treebank data the exact parser state encountered
56Original POS New POS Affected words
Brown










PWS PWS-WER wer, wen (who)
PWAT PWAT-WELCHE welche (which)
PWS PWS-WAS was (what)
PWAV PWAV-WANN wann (when)
PWAV PWAV-WO wo (where)
PWAV PWAV-WARUM warum (why)
PWAT PWAT-WIEVIEL wieviel, wievielen (how)
PWAV PWAV-WIE wie (how)
PWAV PWAV-WIEVIEL wieviel (how)
KOUS KOUS-OB ob (whether)
Swedish
PO PO-VEM vem, vems (who)
PO PO-VILKEN vilken, vilket, vilka (which)
PO PO-VAD vad (what)
AB AB-NAR n¨ ar (when)
AB AB-DAR d¨ ar (where)
PO PO-VAR var (where)
AB AB-VARFOR varf¨ or (why)
AB AB-HUR hur (how)
UK UK-OM om (whether)
Russian
S S-WHO kto, kogo, komu, kem, kom (who)
A A-WHICH kako@ i, kaka, kakoe (which)
S S-WHAT qto, qego, qemu, qem, qm (what)
CONJ CONJ-WHEN kogda (when)
ADV ADV-WHERE gde, kuda, otkuda (where)
ADV ADV-WHY poqemu (why)
ADV ADV-HOW kak (how)
PART PART-WHETHER li (whether)
Table 4.4: Question word parts-of-speech (POS) were changed to make the parser sensitive
to gradience in wh-words.
57during parsing. This is particularly true considering difﬁcult sentences like those that demon-
strate syntactic locality violations. If the exact parser state is not found, how can the parser
decide what action is best based on its treebank experience?
The answer is in using only speciﬁc features of the parser state to inform parser decisions.
Each feature bases parser decisions on a select amount of information from the parser state.
One simple probabilistic feature is Distance: it considers how far apart two words are in a
sentence, and bases decisions on that information. For the Nivre parser, the two words are 1
and 2. They can be arbitrarily far apart in the sentence; after all, the Right-Arc, Left-Arc,
and Swap transitions manipulate  so that the two words at the top of the stack need not be
neighbors within the sentence. At runtime, the parser can query the Distance feature to see
which parser action is best to take when 1 and 2 are one word apart, or two words apart,
and so on.
This information must be translated from the state-action bank format into a series of fea-
ture banks to be usable at runtime. The feature bank for the Distance feature is created by
printing out, for each parser state, the transition that was taken and the distance between 1
and 2. This is done for each of the probabilistic features considered here, further detailed in
Section 4.5. The next section discusses how these feature banks are turned into probabilities
that inform parser decisions.
4.4.5 7 , 8 , and 9 : From feature banks to probabilistic features
The feature banks consist of transitions and feature instances, as shown in the Feature Corpus
in the diagram in Figure 4.5. But, the parser requires probabilities for taking each action shown
in the Feature Probabilities. Machine learning provides a method for learning the patterns in
the feature banks, which result in weights for each transition and feature instance.
58The machine learning implementation used here is liblinear 1.5 (Lin, Weng, & Keerthi,
2008), a tool that uses support-vector machines (SVMs). Unlike other SVM implementations,
this tool provides fast learning over the large amounts of treebank data required for this re-
search. And, because it is based on SVMs, it provides high accuracy for transition-based
dependency parsers, and the Nivre system in particular (Yamada & Matsumoto, 2003; Attardi,
2006; Nivre, 2009). Liblinear’s output is a list of feature instances, along with weights for each
parser action. These weights are then normalized: each weight is divided by the sum of the
four action weights, resulting in probabilities for each parser action3.
The feature probabilities following 8 in the diagram show the predictions for Distance.
When 1 and 2 are one word apart, or neighbors, all four actions are roughly equally proba-
ble. But when they are six words apart, the most probable action is Shift. Distance is a simple
feature that has the advantage of being generalizable: the parser will likely not encounter a
state in the experimental data that has not been encountered in the treebank data. One down-
fall of a generalizable feature is that it is less informative: the probabilities are likely to be even
or not very helpful in many cases, and accuracy is usually low. The next section discusses how
the cognitive theories are implemented as informative probabilistic features for the syntactic
locality data.
3I normalize weights at run-time within the parser, but for ease of description the normalized weights are
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5   almost      RB                    6
6   nothing    NN                    7
7   rates        VBZ                   0
8   higher      JJR                   7
9   than         IN                       8
10 what        WP-WHAT     15
11 the           DT                    13
12 movie      NN                   13
13 men         NNS                 14











Distance-1  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-1  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-2  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-3  No         No        Yes       No
Distance-4  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-2  Yes        No        No        No





Distance-1  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-1  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-2  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-3  No         No        Yes       No
Distance-4  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-2  Yes        No        No        No





Shift               Distance-1           
Shift               Distance-1
Left                Distance-1                   
Shift               Distance-2                 
Shift               Distance-2  







Distance-1  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-1  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-2  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-3  No         No        Yes       No
Distance-4  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-2  Yes        No        No        No






Distance-1  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-1  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-2  No         Yes       No        No
Distance-3  No         No        Yes       No
Distance-4  Yes        No        No        No
Distance-2  Yes        No        No        No





Distance-1  0.4        0.26      0.3     0.04
Distance-2  0.5        0.12      0.16   0.22
Distance-3  0.23      0.28      0.36   0.13
Distance-4  0.28      0.36      0.13   0.23
Distance-5  0.26      0.04      0.4     0.3
Distance-6  0.01      0.82      0.1     0.03





I saw who Emma doubted reports that..
I saw which employee Emma doubted...
I saw who Emma doubted a report...
Experimental Difficulty
I                             56ms
saw                       92ms
who                      102ms
Emma                  98ms
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Surprisal
I                             0.89
saw                       1.04
who                       2.34
Emma                  1.33
Distance Retrieval
I                             51ms
saw                       182ms
who                       51ms








Figure 4.5: Parsing non-projective dependencies.
604.5 Cognitive theories as probabilistic features
There are a variety of ways that cognitive theories can be implemented in a human sentence
processsing model. First, they could simply be implemented as metrics in their own right. For
example, retrieval (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005) is a metric that provides a measure of difﬁculty
in terms of milliseconds. It can be directly compared to data. The DLT (Gibson, 2000) can
also be directly compared to data since it provides a numerical reading of difﬁculty in terms of
open discourse referents. In fact, one could convert each of the memory theories considerd in
Chapter 3 directly into metrics to compare to data.
One of the reasons the theories are not encoded as metrics in the parser is because it
would make comparison across metrics difﬁcult. Because the metrics are different, it’s not
clear that a direct comparison would be informative. A direct comparison would also lack the
beneﬁt of the broad-coverage, working cognitive model. Researchers have argued for some
time that human sentence processing models should move away from small models that work
on relatively few sentences to broad-coverage models (Crocker & Brants, 2000; Crocker, 2005;
Keller, 2010). Encoding the cognitive theories as metrics would not ensure the beneﬁt of this
approach.
The main reason the cognitive theories are encoded as features rather than metrics is
because features can help inform parser decisions, rather than simply be a result of them.
Probabilistic features based on cognitive theories, particularly those focused on memory limi-
tations in the human processor, provide a more adequate human sentence processing model
not only for syntactic locality, but for all phenomena. The dependency parser used in previous
work had an unlimited memory: words from arbitrarily far back in the sentence could be ac-
cessed, no matter how much time (or parse steps) had passed. An accurate cognitive model
requires memory limitations; these can be achieved by changing the architecture, but they can
also be achieved by using probabilistic features. Although the metrics may provide a direct
61implementation of the cognitive theories, implementing them as probabilistic features provides
a model of memory limitations informed by human-based theories.
The theories could have also been encoded as hard constraints in the parser. For example,
one could construct a hard DLT constraint that prohibits attachments once the DLT value is
higher than 4. But, this seems to go against the variable nature of cognitive constraints:
violations of cognitive constraints depend on how much memory is available. If the memory
burden on the rest of the sentence, for example from lexical information, is relatively low, then
perhaps attachments can be made at a higher DLT. Further, it’s not exactly clear where to draw
the line between acceptable and unacceptable values for any of these metrics. This would
require extensive experimental and statistical analyses that, though interesting, fall beyond the
scope of this work.
The cognitive theories are therefore encoded as soft constraints, which in this case are
probabilistic features. Soft constraints have several advantages over hard constraints: they
are naturally violable and cumulative, which could help in addressing gradience patterns in the
syntactic locality data. They are sensitive to probabilities derived from corpus data, and can
therefore take into account cross-linguistic variation. And they can be directly compared: not
only can the cognitive theories be rated based on their accuracy in determining dependency
analyses for syntactic sentences, but surprisal (Hale, 2001) can be used to determine how
much difﬁculty the cognitive theories allot to different sentences.
It is this last factor that makes implementing cognitive theories as probabilistic features
most appealing for better understanding syntactic locality: this directly compares the cognitive
theories on the exact same broad-coverage parsing mechanism. The only difference is what
aspects of memory the parser is sensitive to when deciding which action to choose. It could
be sensitive to activation-based information, such as how far apart two words are (Distance),
or interference-based information, such as whether any similar words occur between the two
words considered for attachment (Interferers). It could even take into account both factors and
62Feature Feature Type Includes







Retrieval Time (ms.) retrievalTime(2)
Table 4.5: Feature speciﬁcation. :: indicates concatenation.
decide which parser action is best by how long it would take to retrieve the word from memory
(ProbRetrieval).
The rest of this section details how to deﬁne probabilistic features based on each of the
cognitive hypotheses considered in Chapter 3. The feature deﬁnitions are provided in Ta-
ble 4.5. Section 4.5.1 describes the two activation-based features, Distance and Decay. Sec-
tion 4.5.2 discusses the interference-based features, Filler, Intervenors, Interferers, and SBI.
Section 4.5.3 discusses the two theories that take into account both quantities, DLT and Pro-
bRetrieval. More details on the cognitive theories that inform these features, as well as why
they were selected, is available in Chapter 3.
4.5.1 Activation
Distance
The Distance feature captures the intuition that the distance between two words can affect the
processing difﬁculty in integrating them. The parser is made sensitive to distance by basing
the likelihood of parser actions on how far apart two words are, as in (29).
(29) Distance: String position of j1   1j
63The distance between who and captured for the CNP sentence in Figure 4.6 is 7. The
parser would determine whether to create this attachment by considering the probability of
attaching words that are 7 words apart in the training data. If the training data has more































Figure 4.6: How likely is an attachment between who and captured?
Decay
The Decay feature is one of the addends in the Lewis and Vasishth (2005) retrieval equation.
It represents the baseline activation for a word that is to be retrieved, and is meant to capture
the memory decay of words that have already been heard in the sentence. Words that are
further back, and which have not been re-activated with recent attachments, have lower base-
line activations; within the retrieval equation, this causes an increase in retrieval time since it
takes longer to retrieve a word that has been subject to memory decay. Details on the base-
line activation and retrieval equations, as well as how they were translated into the parser, are
available in Section 4.6.2. For the purposes here, the probabilistic feature for activation con-
sists simply of the quantity returned by the baseline activation equation for retrieval, as in (30).
Baseline activation quantities were rounded to the hundredths position. The parser calculates
the Decay of who for the CNP example above as -3.37.
(30) Decay: Value of baselineActivation(2)
644.5.2 Interference
Filler
The Filler feature is sensitive to the POS of the ﬁrst-encountered wh-word that is still un-
resolved, deﬁned as in (31). It is considered an interference feature because unresolved
ﬁllers are a memory burden that can interfere with dependencies between unrelated words
(Charles Clifton & Frazier, 1986). For all parser actions that occur between when who is ﬁrst
encountered and when it is ﬁnally attached to captured, the value of Filler is WP-WHO.
(31) Filler: POS of wh word
Intervenors
The Intervenors feature is sensitve to the POS of any intervenors, or discourse referents, that
occur between two words, as in (32). It can be considered a more-informative version of
the DLT because it considers the type, rather than just the number, of intervening discourse
referents. Even though it is considered a more informative version of DLT, it is classiﬁed as
an interference feature because it doesn’t explicitly take into account distance or activation:
it simply lists the words that interfere with processing, according to the DLT. For the CNP
example, the value of the feature is PRPjNNSjNNP, for each of the nominal intervenors that
have occurred between the two words, beginning with the most recent, we.
(32) Intervenors: POS of intervenors(1:::2)
65Interferers
Like, Intervenors, Interferers takes into account the POS of certain words that occur between
1 and 2. Rather than considering nominal intervenors, this feature focuses on the words that
SBI (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005) considers to interfere with the retrieval of 2. As with Decay, the
full speciﬁcation of SBI is included in Section 4.6.2. But for the interesting cases in syntactic
locality, SBI will consider any wh-word from the list in Table 4.4 as interfering with the extracted
wh-word being retrieved for syntactic locality. For the CNP example, though, there is no wh-
word between who and captured. In the case where these two words are at the top of the
stack, Interferers would be NULL.
(33) Interferers: POS of interferers(2)
SBI
The SBI feature is the numerical quantity that the Lewis and Vasishth (2005) retrieval equation
assigns for SBI. It takes into account how many words interfere with the retrieved word and
returns a value. The SBI value operates such that retrieved words that have more interference
from other words in the sentence have less activation and therefore take more time to retrieve.
The reader is referred to Section 4.6.2 for more details on how SBI is implemented in the
parser. The feature is deﬁned as in (34), and the values are rounded to the hundredths decimal
point. Its value for the CNP example is 1.50.
(34) SBI: Value of SBI(2)
664.5.3 Composite
DLT
The DLT feature translates the intuitions from the DLT theory into a probabilistic feature. The
DLT captures the intuition that longer dependencies are problematic in sentence process-
ing. However, long dependencies are not all equally difﬁcult: it depends on what kinds of
words intervene. For the DLT, open discourse referents, like nominals, increase the difﬁculty
of long-distance dependencies because they need to be held in memory until their head verb
is encountered. (35) shows the feature deﬁnition: it returns a count of all nominal intervenors
between 1 and 2. For the CNP example, this would be 3.
(35) DLT: Count of nominalIntervenors(1:::2)
ProbRetrieval
The most complicated feature is derived from the most complex and encompassing of the
memory theories considered. ProbRetrieval (probabilistic retrieval) bases sentence process-
ing difﬁculty on how difﬁcult a word is to retrieve from memory. Although all of the memory
theories considered aim to quantify this idea, retrieval as deﬁned by Lewis and Vasishth (2005)
arguably encompasses them all. It bases retrieval difﬁculty on two explicit quantities, activa-
tion and interference, which are calculated from principles of an independent general cognitive
framework. Full details on the retrieval theory and its calculation in the parser are available in
Chapter 3.4.3 and Section 4.6.2. To turn the theory into a probabilistic feature, the retrieval
time of 2 is estimated and rounded to the nearest whole number. For the CNP example,
retrieval time for who is estimated as 91ms, which is the value of the feature.
(36) ProbRetrieval: Value of retrieval(2)
67Each of these feature deﬁnitions are used in the FeatureMaker tool diagrammed in steps
7 and 8 and described in Section 4.4.4. Once these feature treebanks are submitted to
the SVM learner, the output is a set of probabilities for each of the parser actions, based on
the feature’s instance value.
4.6 Complexity metrics
The point of the working cognitive model is that it should be able to predict when humans
will ﬁnd certain sentences difﬁcult. But, in order to do this, there must be a way to measure
parser difﬁculty. There are two complexity metrics considered in this cognitive model to predict
human difﬁculty. The ﬁrst, surprisal (Hale, 2001), considers changes in the probability space
as a sentence is parsed. The advantage of this metric is that it can directly compare the
difﬁculty that probabilistic features are sensitive to, and determine which cognitive theories
perform best as probabilistic features. The second, retrieval (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005), is the
direct encoding of the retrieval complexity metric on this parser. Retrieval is the most explicit of
the cognitive theories considered, and encoding it as its own metric allows for a direct measure
of the reductionist hypothesis. This section discusses how both are implemented, beginning
with surprisal in Section 4.6.1.
4.6.1 Surprisal
Surprisal offers a complexity metric for broad-coverage human sentence processing models. It
not only eliminates the need for hand-coding small models, but it also incorporates frequency
and grammatical information that is known to affect sentence processing. It is able to do this by
being sensitive to the probabilistic space that the parser explores as it is parsing a sentence–
that is the probabilistic space explored by any probabilistic model, operating on any grammar,
68informed by any parsing strategy. Previous work in this paradigm demonstrates surprisal’s
adaptability by introducing a deﬁnition of surprisal appropriate for transition systems rather
than grammars (Boston et al., 2011). This section discusses this implementation.
Surprisal is based on how the preﬁx-probability changes from one word to the next during
a parse. A word’s preﬁx-probability is calculated as the sum of all transitional probabilities t





This work focuses on a serial version of the parser; therefore, the preﬁx-probability considers
only one t. This transitional probability t must be in the set of allowable Nivre derivations
between grammars and strings, NIVRE(D). The derivations must also be complete: for any
preﬁx w, there must be a sufﬁx v that would result in a grammatical sentence of the grammar
G. The transitional probability t is calculated by multiplying all the transitional probabilities, or
action probabilities, that have led to the word being parsed. This is illustrated by the diagram
in Figure 4.7.
This diagram shows a parse of the running example sentence of a CNP violation. The
snippet shows the transitions from when the relative clause is introduced by that until the em-
bedded verb (and head of the extracted wh-word, who) is parsed. The y axis shows probabili-
ties and the x axis the words in the sentence. The blue boxes are states, and listed within the
state are the transitions that led to the state as well as the transitional probability to that point.
The probabilities are actual probabilities from the Distance feature discussed in Section 4.5.1.
As can be seen in the diagram, each state’s preﬁx-probability is calculated by multiplying the
transition probability, such as 0.314 for Shifting we, by the previous word’s preﬁx-probability
(2.965e-06 for that). Because this is a serial parser, only one preﬁx-probability is considered
for the surprisal calculation, and this is the preﬁx-probability before the next word is shifted



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































70Surprisal is then calculated as the change in preﬁx-probability between words, formalized
as in Equation 4.2. It is the negative log of the current word’s preﬁx-probability divided by the
previous word’s preﬁx-probability; in other words, the change in the probability space once the
current word has been parsed. This equation captures the intuition that transitions that lead to
“surprising” words or analyses have lower probabilities; these lower probabilities indicate an







In the diagram in Figure 4.7, surprisals at that, we, and had are relatively low. In fact, that
and had appear to have the same surprisal, although that is simply an effect of the rounding
done for the ﬁgure; the transition probability does not affect the preﬁx-probability very much,
indicating that encountering a personal pronoun (PRP) after a complementizer (IN) is not sur-
prising for the Distance feature. On the other hand, surprisal is higher once the verb captured
is encountered. This is a result of two things: ﬁrst, it is because the process of attaching a
non-projective dependency from captured to who requires many states and transitions. For
each transition, the preﬁx-probability is reduced by multiplying probabilities, leading to a lower
ﬁnal preﬁx-probability for captured (1.497e-18) than for had (5.396e-08). Further, many of the
probabilities for these transitions are low: the Swap transitions in particular are not predicted
by the Distance feature.
The surprisal value for captured is higher than for other words, indicating that creating
the CNP island-violating dependency is difﬁcult. This is a good thing for the cognitive model.
But, there is a potential problem. Non-projective sentences are more difﬁcult than projective
sentences because of the large number of actions required to make them. But, non-projective
sentences are not always more difﬁcult than projective sentences (Levy, Fedorenko, Breen, &
Gibson, Submitted), and this parsing model would not be able to correctly model this result. On
71the other hand, because wrap-up effects generally lead to higher processing difﬁculty (Just &
Carpenter, 1980; Rayner, Kambe, & Duffy, 2000), this is considered a feature rather than a bug
of the system. Further, all of the non-projective sentences considered here are in strong island
and highly unacceptable contexts for human speakers, so the parser should report difﬁculty
when modeling them.
Despite this potential problem, there is one important beneﬁt of using surprisal for this
study. It allows a standard of comparison across probabilistic features and hence cognitive
theories. Consider a situation where the parser is attempting to decide whether to attach 1
and 2. The words happen to be two words apart: there is one intervening word. Because the
words are only two words apart, the activation features like Distance and Decay would consider
a Left-Arc and Right-Arc transition likely: these features are highly local and attachment
probabilities decrease with length. But what if the word that intervenes interferes with 2? For
activation features, this would make no difference. If the words are only two words apart, 2’s
activation is high, attachment probabilities are high, and surprisal will be low.
Interference features, on the other hand, would be sensitive to this intervenor’s interference,
and will have lower attachment probabilities and higher surprisal when compared with a case
where the intervening word does not interfere. If humans also have more difﬁculty with the
interfering case, then one could say that the better model is the interference model rather than
the activation model. This allows the model to address the question of which cognitive theory
best explains syntactic locality: activation, interference, or both.
4.6.2 Retrieval
Retrieval, as developed by Lewis and Vasishth (2005), bases sentence comprehension difﬁ-
culty on the need to retrieve structures from working memory. Experimental evidence suggests
72that there is a cost associated with this retrieval process (Caplan & Waters, 1999; Gibson,
1998; Gordon et al., 2004; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Just & Varma, 2002; Lewis, 1999; Warren
& Gibson, 2002; Grodner & Gibson, 2005), and retrieval explicitly links this difﬁculty to work-
ing memory limitations using the general cognitive framework Adaptive Control of Thought-
Rational (ACT-R) (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2005). The central insight of this
approach is that strains on working memory translate to sentence processing difﬁculty.
The parsing system implemented in Lewis and Vasishth (2005) uses condition-action pairs
informed by a phrase structure grammar to drive parsing. The system also uses a series of
memory buffers to represent long-term and short-term storage of elements. The architecture
makes use of parallel, associative retrieval (McElree et al., 2003), activation ﬂuctuations of ele-
ments already in memory, and similarity-based retrieval interference. Together, they determine
the amount of time it takes to process each word, and these time predictions provide a metric
of sentence processing difﬁculty.
Abstracting from the implementation-particular aspects of the Lewis and Vasishth (2005)
formulation, the constraint on working memory that most directly translates to sentence pro-
cessing difﬁculty is the amount of time it takes to retrieve a word (Vasishth, Br¨ ussow, Lewis,
& Drenhaus, 2008). This is accomplished in the dependency parser by translating the ACT-R
formulation of retrieval to the Nivre transition system: a retrieval occurs whenever the parser
draws a dependency arc. The retrieval time of the word that is to be attached (or attached to)
is based on that word’s activation, which is calculated as in Equation 4.3 (Lewis & Vasishth,
2005).




Activation is based on two separate quantities. One is the word’s baseline activation Bi,
which calculates activation decay due solely to the passage of time, as in Equation 4.4. In
73particular, baseline activation for wordi is the summation over the time since the jth retrieval of
wordi, tj. The parameter d is set to 0.5, as in most ACT-R models (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005).
Bi = ln
0







C C C C C C A (4.4)
The second variable that is used in determining a word’s activation is the amount of SBI that
occurs with other words that have been parsed, given by the second addend in Equation 4.3.
SBI is estimated by the weighted strengths of association between the word to be retrieved
and other words already parsed, depicted in Equation 4.5.
Sji = S   ln(fanj) (4.5)
In Equation 4.5, word j is a word similar to word i. In this formulation, similarity is determined
by part-of-speech classes, with, for example, nouns being able to interfere with other nouns,
but not with verbs. In terms of syntactic locality, the only interference that is of interest is
between wh-words. Therefore, all wh-word POS listed in Table 4.4 are considered “similar”. If
word j is similar, the amount it interferes with word i is determined by fanj, or the number of
words already associated with j. S equals the maximum associative strength of 1.5 (Lewis &
Vasishth, 2005).
This interference variable has a weight, Wj, associated with the number of elements in the
goal chunk. It is formalized as G/j by Lewis and Vasishth (2005), where G is a constant set to
1.0 and j is the number of cues in the goal chunk. Because the parser is unlexicalized, there
will only be one cue for each retrieved item, the POS. Therefore, Wj is simpliﬁed to equal 1.0
for all retrievals.
The addition of a word’s baseline activation plus any SBI provides the word’s activation, Ai.
This activation is used to calculate the sentence processing metric used in this study, the time
to retrieve the word. The equation is given in 4.6, where F is estimated at 0.14, following the
74Lewis and Vasishth (2005) implementation, and e is Euler’s constant.
Ti = Fe
 Ai (4.6)
The ACT-R formulation of retrieval also incorporates ﬁxed “production” rules of 50 ms.
for taking actions, where productions directly translate to actions programmed in the ACT-R
planner. In this formulation, productions are registered for taking a Shift, Left-Arc, and
Right-Arc action, but not for a Swap action because this does not explicitly change the de-
pendency analysis. Productions are also registered for deciding to retrieve items, as in the
ACT-R formulation. The time it takes to integrate a word into the analysis is therefore deter-
mined on the basis of both productions and retrievals, as speciﬁed in Table 4.6. As in the
ACT-R formulation of retrieval, the amount of time it takes to read a word is set to 1ms.
Left-Arc 50ms. + 50ms. + Retrieval Time.
Right-Arc 50ms. + 50ms. + Retrieval Time.
Shift 50ms.
Swap 0ms.
Table 4.6: How time is determined in the parser.
Figure 4.8 diagrams how the retrieval calculation works on the running CNP example. No-
tice that the state and transitions are exactly the same as the surprisal calculation in Figure 4.7.
The main difference is that now the y axis is the amount of time in milliseconds, and the x axis
shows the words and their parse times based on retrieval. It would seem that surprisal and
retrieval make complementary predictions about sentence processing difﬁculty, but as can be
seen by comparing the two calculation diagrams, this is not exactly correct in this parsing
model. If it were so, the diagrams should appear to be the inverses of each other, with actions
that require high parse times for retrieval being low-probability for surprisal. Although there are
a few places where this almost appears to be so, it’s not the case; this conﬁrms the intuitions of
Boston et al. (2011) that there is some overlap in the difﬁculty attributions of the two quantities.
This is also likely because the surprisal calculations are based on Distance, a probabilistic fea-
75ture that, though often used for standard dependency parsing (Eisner & Smith, 2005, 2010), is
also the basis for a strong cognitive theory.
It should be noted that aside from the translation from ACT-R productions and retrievals
to the Nivre dependency system, the calculation of retrievals follows directly from the ACT-R
principles in the Lewis and Vasishth (2005) implementation. Also, all numerical constants in
Equations 4.3-4.6 are kept at the default values in ACT-R. These equations are constant not
only for the retrieval metric, but also for the Decay, SBI, and ProbRetrieval probabilistic features
discussed in Section 4.5.
Finally, consider the differences in the two implementations of retrieval used in this work.
The discussion in this section has centered on the retrieval metric, which most directly encodes
the retrieval discussed in Lewis and Vasishth (2005). It provides a parsing time estimate for
each word in a sentence based on the memory burden required to build analyses. But, retrieval
is also a probabilistic feature, ProbRetrieval. The probabilistic feature also seeks to encode the
intuition behind retrieval, but less directly. In this case, the amount of retrieval time affects the
likelihood of attaching words in a sentence: in a way, it drives parsing rather than being the
outcome of a parse. Although the two quantities should behave similarly, it is likely they will
make conﬂicting predictions in some cases. This is because the probabilistic ProbRetrieval
is sensitive to the treebank information. For example, there may be an attachment that the
retrieval theory would consider particularly difﬁcult, such as with a word that is far away. But,
probabilistic ProbRetrieval may have learned, from all the treebank data, that German, for
example, tends to like to perform Right-Arc attachments when words are far away, reﬂecting
verb-secondhood in German. In this case, the probabilistic ProbRetrieval would give a low
surprisal rating, whereas the retrieval metric, Retrieval, would be relatively high. Whether this
beneﬁt plays out in the syntactic locality data, or even other psycholinguistically interesting












































































































































































































































































































































































































774.7 Dependency length and difﬁculty
This parser uses metrics that are sensitive to the number of parser actions required to parse
a word. For surprisal, each parser action decreases the transition probability. If there are
many parser actions between words, the preﬁx probability for that word will be lower than the
previous word, and the surprisal value will be high. Likewise, each parser action has a ﬁxed
millisecond cost for retrieval; the more parser actions required to retrieve a word, the higher
that word’s retrieval time.
In the Nivre transition system, dependencies can only be constructed between words that
are adjacent in the stack memory. The farther apart two words are, the more likely that other
words intervene in the stack, and the more likely that many parser actions are required to bring
the two words close to each other. Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 demonstrate this issue for the
running CNP example. Notice that because the verb captured and its dependent who are far
apart, many Swap transitions are required to get them next to each other, and then many Swap-
Shift-Shift sequences are required to reorder the sentence. These transitions bring down the
preﬁx-probability for surprisal, and drive up the production costs for retrieval, leading to high
parser difﬁculty.
This tendency for longer dependencies to be harder in the parser works well for the cogni-
tive model; generally, long-distance dependencies lead to more human difﬁculty. However, it is
not the case that long-distance dependencies are always harder than shorter-distance depen-
dencies, particularly if those shorter dependencies include nesting or other known memory
burdens. When this is the case, the parser is not likely to be a good model of difﬁculty.
Although there is a tendency for the parser to have high difﬁculty with longer dependencies,
this tendency can be over-ridden. It may be the case that the individual transition probabilities
are high enough that they offset the probability decrease associated with multiplying probabil-
ities. It may also be the case that the calculated activation for a word is high enough (because
78it has been reactivated in memory) that its retrieval time would offset the high production costs
for retrieving it. In the small number of cases where the experimental sentences have a de-
pendency length mismatch, the cognitive constraints may be able to over-ride this tendency
and correctly model the data.
These issues further support the use of associative memory for human models, as well as
more human-like memory constraints. For this particular task, this issue is only problematic
for a subset of the SUV data, as is discussed in Chapter 7.
4.8 Accuracy
One of the difﬁculties in developing a human cognitive model is that parser accuracy can be
difﬁcult to determine. The development set is often the same as the test set, which can lead
to data overﬁtting, and sometimes even questionable cognitive models (Keller, 2010). The
focus of this research is to discover how well cognitive features model syntactic locality; it is
not to develop an accurate model of the phenomena, but rather to test how well a theory can
handle the phenomena. Because of that, the simulations employ a methodology that factors
the traditional notion of parser accuracy out of the model and focuses entirely on the surprisal
and retrieval predictions for the gold parse.
This work departs from previous work not only for this parser but for many human sentence
processing models in that accuracy will not be determined by the resulting dependency anal-
ysis. In broad-coverage parsing models, accuracy is measured by an f-score, or the precision
and recall the parser has in building the correct analysis, or gold parse (Manning & Sch¨ utze,
1999, p.269). This particular parsing model has often had high accuracy for psycholinguis-
tic sentences, particularly sentences from eye-tracking corpora (Boston et al., 2008, 2011).
But it used a sequence of probabilistic features that had been tuned to work well with broad-
79coverage data; it is unclear how accurate the cognitive features considered here would be.
Further, the model had been tested on relatively “easy” sentences; CNP and WHI sentences
are known to be difﬁcult for humans, and the fact that they involve unbounded dependencies
indicate that parser accuracy is likely to be low for even well-tuned implementations like the
MALTParser (Nivre et al., 2010). Therefore, the parser is run on the gold parse itself, such as
the dependency analysis in Figure 4.6.
This has a variety of advantages. The ﬁrst, and most important, is that it allows for a
clear comparison of exactly the cognitive theories considered here. They are not obscured
by, for example, additional features required to ensure relatively good parsing accuracy. In-
stead, the surprisal and retrieval values will directly tell how difﬁcult it is to make a CNP, WHI,
or superiority-violating attachment. Further, it avoids the debate over whether the violating
dependencies are created and simply difﬁcult, or if they are not created at all. The answer
to this question is unclear, and the different cognitive hypotheses would likely make different
predictions. Although it would be interesting to do more in-depth research into this question,
this model is kept as simple as possible and the question is avoided. It is assumed that all
the cognitive hypotheses make the attachment, and in fact build the same exact dependency
analysis. Accuracy is determined by how much difﬁculty they assign.
Unfortunately, this mode of running the parser also has a disadvantage: the parser must
be run in serial mode. This particular parsing model has the ability to be run as either serial or
parallel, and previous work has demonstrated that parallel models are most accurate (Boston
et al., 2011). Further, preliminary work on SUVs in this parsing model found that using the
increased memory of a parallel model offered a simple explanation of the gradience patterns
in SUV data (Boston, 2010). Although the gold-parse mode of running the parser eliminates
these options, they are still available for future work as this parsing model can easily be run for
attachment accuracy.
Despite these issues, the parser will be run on gold parses as this provides the cleanest test
80of the contributions of the various cognitive theories to a reductionist explanation of syntactic
locality.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter discusses how a dependency parser is implemented as a cognitive model for
syntactic locality. The transition system used has the advantages of being probabilistic, in-
cremental, and broad-coverage, allowing for a simple and accurate cross-linguistic sentence
processing model that has been independently successful. It also allows for a simple encod-
ing of cognitive theories, both as probabilistic features and as complexity metrics. The next




As with any controversial data set, the work on syntactic locality is rife with examples, coun-
terexamples, and typological challenges. This work incorporates each aspect of this contro-




Classic examples demonstrate the typical linguistic intuition behind a syntactic locality phe-
nomenon. Often, these are syntactic judgments, but when possible they are conditions taken
from experimental work. Gradience examples are counterexamples to the classic cases.
For syntactic locality, they demonstrate gradience, or degrees of acceptability, which are of-
ten problematic for grammatical explanations. Cognitive factors should model gradience well,
though, and these examples are often cited as evidence for reductionist accounts. Challenges
are examples that demonstrate CNPs, WHIs, and SUVs going against to cognitive predictions;
these are the examples often cited as evidence against reductionsist accounts.
The organizational chart in Figure 5.1 diagrams the experiments considered in this work.
Bold boxes indicate that the experiment is used to support either the grammatical or reduc-





















































Figure 5.1: An organizational chart of syntactic locality experiments.
The majority of the experimental work on syntactic locality is in English, but a beneﬁt of the
broad-coverage model is its ability to handle cross-linguistic data. Further, the broad-coverage
model can test the same implementation of a cognitive factor across many languages: one
Decay probabilistic feature is encoded, for example, and then run on multiple treebanks. This
research therefore includes cross-linguistic data as often as possible: German data is avail-
able for all three phenomena, and it sometimes patterns with and sometimes against English
results. Swedish data is considered because of arguments that Swedish speakers do not
ﬁnd CNP and WHI violations difﬁcult. And Russian experimental data for SUVs is used as a
challenge to reductionist accounts, since the data suggests Russian does not have SUVs.
83This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses various experimental mea-
sures. This helps inform the discussion of the experimental data itself, organized by phe-
nomenon in Section 5.3, Section 5.4, and Section 5.5. Section 5.6 details experimental data
that was not considered due to a variety of factors.
5.2 Measures
5.2.1 Syntactic judgments
The advantage of the computational model designed here is that its complexity metrics can
be compared to ﬁne-grained difﬁculty measures, such as reading times (Boston et al., 2011).
But, it can also model simpler syntactic judgments. Syntactic judgments are the most coarse-
grained measure of difﬁculty: sentences are marked as either acceptable or unacceptable (or,
more controversially, grammatical and ungrammatical). Haider (2004) provides the following
judgments, where the SUV in the second sentence is classiﬁed unacceptable by the asterisk
preceding it.
(37) Who did you persuade her to visit?
(38) *Who did you persuade who to visit?
For the studies considered here that include syntactic judgments, the star designation is
switched to a numerical one: acceptable sentences are marked 0 and unacceptable sentences
marked 1. This aids in comparison to other studies, as discussed in Section 6.3.
845.2.2 Acceptability and Magnitude Estimation
Syntactic studies are only used when experimental results are unavailable. For syntactic lo-
cality, the majority of this experimental work uses acceptability judgments. Speakers rate
sentences on a scale that goes beyond the binary classiﬁcation of syntactic judgments. The
scale can be ordinal or continuous. Ordinal scales have subjects rate a sentence from, for
example, 1 to 7, with 1 being “completely unacceptable” and 7 “completely acceptable”. The
ordinal scales allow for gradient results, which is a distinct advantage over syntactic studies.
But, they also don’t allow for the level of accuracy that a continous scale has.
Therefore, there are other studies that use Magnitude Estimation (ME) (Stevens, 1975).
ME studies operate as follows: subjects are asked to rate a perfectly normal sentence some
number. They are then asked to compare subsequent test sentences to this modulus, as-
signing number ratings such as “twice as difﬁcult”. Performing a log-transformation on these
judgments allows different subjects’ scales to be compared. This technique has the beneﬁt
of being directly comparable across speakers while also giving a granularity that can yield
statistically signiﬁcant results (Bard, Robertson, & Sorace, 1996; Cowart, 1997).
5.2.3 Reading Time and Residual Reading Time (RRT)
Some of the studies make use of reading time data from self-paced reading studies. The
amount of time it takes to read a word is correlated to processing difﬁculty, such that the
longer it takes to read a word, the more processing difﬁculty at that word. Self-paced reading
experiments generally operate as follows: a subject is shown a sentence on a computer screen
one word at a time, with subsequent words revealed by a key press. The lag time between key
presses is the reading time for that word.
Experimenters can either use the exact reading time, or use a calculation of reading time
85that takes into account word length, Residual Reading Time (RRT). RRT is calculated by ﬁrst
using a linear regression to calculate a prediction of the amount of time it takes for each
participant to read a word of a particular length. This prediction is subtracted from the actual
reading time to get the RRT. Positive RRTs mean that the word is read slower than predicted,
and that subjects are encountering difﬁculty at that word.
There is variation in these measures, both in terms of granularity and in terms of method-
ologies. But, even when two experiments use the same measure, their results can not be
directly compared. This problem is addressed in Section 6.3; ﬁrst, the experiments that pro-
vide classic, gradience, and challenging examples for each of the phenomena are discussed.
5.3 CNP
5.3.1 Classic
The classic CNP example comes from a larger experiment from Hofmeister and Sag (2010).
This experiment tests the effect of both the ﬁller-type and determinacy of the noun on gradi-
ence in CNP island violation acceptability. But, two of its conditions demonstrate the classic
difﬁculty associated with CNP violations in English. The conditions are shown in Figure 5.2,
along with their dependency analyses. The analyses will be discussed further in Section 6.2.1.
In this example, the second condition includes a CNP island violation: which convict is ex-
tracted from the CNP island phrase [reports that we had captured...]. The island is marked by
brackets, and the crucial dependency is marked by a dashed blue line.
This extraction from the island has a higher RRT, indicating that it is more difﬁcult. One
problem with this particular data set is that it doesn’t demonstrate a strong CNP island effect:

































































Figure 5.2: CNP classic example 1: English (measure: RRT).
who is extracted from the CNP. Unfortunately, this data is unavailable from this experiment.
Although other experiments and syntactic judgments better demonstrate the island effect, their
sentences often have a dependency-length mismatch: the extraction from the CNP island
crosses more words than the non-island. As is detailed in Chapter 4.7, the parser has a strong
tendency to ﬁnd longer dependencies more difﬁcult, which could unfairly skew results in favor
of the cognitive factors. It is difﬁcult to create experimental conditions where the words are
directly matched for the CNP island. In fact, there is a dependency length mismatch in this
example: the CNP island is one word longer than the non-island. However, this example is
used to demonstrate the classic case because the one-word difference is the smallest found
in the English experimental data.
5.3.2 Gradience
The classic example is part of a larger study from Hofmeister and Sag that demonstrates ﬁller-
type gradience for CNPs in English. The conditions are shown in Figure 5.3, where which
convict and who are extracted from the CNP island [report that we had captured...]. This
experiment also tests the deﬁniteness of the complex noun phrase itself (reports... vs. the
report... vs. a report...). Although the study does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in terms of
noun deﬁniteness, RRTs for the which convict conditions are signiﬁcantly faster than the bare
conditions. The which convict condition is also faster than the baseline condition, but this result
is not statistically signiﬁcant, nor conﬁrmed by other studies. The overall result demonstrates








































































































































































































































Figure 5.3: CNP gradience example 1: English (measure: RRT).
Keller (1996) also considers gradience in English CNPs with regards to ﬁller-type. But,
he considers more ﬁller-types by testing Kluender’s speciﬁcity hierarchy (1992). The results
show a different pattern from the Hofmeister and Sag results. Kluender argues that the more
speciﬁc the ﬁller, the more acceptable the extraction from the CNP. Keller has subjects rate
sentences along this hierarchy using ME. The results are shown in Figure 5.4. The most
acceptable condition is the bare condition, who. This is followed by the which theory condition
and the what condition, which have almost equal acceptability. The least acceptable condition
is the how many papers condition. These results do not follow from Kluender’s predictions:
he predicted that the which-N and how-many-N conditions would be easier than the bare
conditions. But the results conﬁrm CNP gradience for ﬁllers, and further support a reductionist









































































































Figure 5.4: CNP gradience example 2: English (measure: acceptability).
5.3.3 Challenges
Reductionists argue that there are many processing factors at play in syntactic locality, and
their combination yields a “perfect storm” of difﬁculty for islands. Sprouse and his colleagues
try to tease apart two of these factors, length and syntactic structure, to determine whether
the two types of processing difﬁculty are a) individually available and b) have strong interaction
to yield islands. They therefore construct four conditions, shown in Figure 5.5, that alternate
length and structure. The ﬁrst condition, Figure 5.5(a), shows a short-distance dependency,
between who and claimed, with no island syntactic structure. This is the short, non-island
condition. The second shows a short-distance dependency which includes an island syntactic
structure. Note that who is not extracted from the island in this case. The third shows a long-
distance dependency, but once again it is not from an island. The ﬁnal condition, and the one
that is found most difﬁcult, has both a long-distance dependency and a syntactic island.
The results are provided with z-scores from an ordinal (7 point) acceptability judgment





































































Figure 5.5: CNP challenge example 1: English (measure: acceptability).
bias when comparing to other participants’ results1, but they can be interpreted just as accept-
ability judgments are (higher z-scores means more acceptable). The authors ﬁnd a deﬁnite
interaction of length and structure, meaning that the island effect in the long, island condition
holds. They also ﬁnd a length effect, such that the longer dependencies are less acceptable
than the short dependencies. But, they do not ﬁnd an effect of structure: the short, island
condition is not statistically-signifcantly less acceptable than the short, non-island. Accord-
ing to the authors, this result challenges reductionist accounts because if both the structure
and the dependency length lead to difﬁculty in islands, one would expect the structure to be
independently difﬁcult.
One concern with this dataset is that the short island condition (Figure 5.5(b)) does not
have extraction from within the island itself. The acceptability judgments test difﬁculty accrued
from the whole sentence, so the CNP island should be difﬁcult regardless of whether an extrac-
tion has been made or not. But, reductionist accounts are based on the difﬁculty of retrieving
a word across a CNP boundary. As will be discussed below in Section 6.2, this cognitive
model tests difﬁculty at the point of retrieval, which in this case is claimed. This means that
1See Sprouse, Wagers, and Phillips (To Appear, p.13) for more information on z-score transformations.
90the parser’s difﬁculty would be considered before the island is encountered, and would likely
not be able to model an island effect. These results are still considered, though, because the
structure effect was not statistically signiﬁcant for the English-speakers.
Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) run a parallel study of CNPs and WHIs in English, Greek,
and German. They not only test islandhood, but also how the level of embedding interacts with
islands across the phenomena. Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the English and German ex-
perimental conditions along with the results, which are mean acceptability judgments from ME.
The results are not as expected: for CNPs in both English and German, the doubly-embedded
structure is more acceptable than the singly-embedded structure. This result seems to be at
odds with a processing explanation, and leads the authors to conclude that CNPs are better-
explained by grammatical approaches. One would predict that the cognitive factors will have






















































Figure 5.6: CNP challenge example 2: English (measure: acceptability).
Finally, perhaps the most well-known challenge to any account of CNPs is data from
































































Figure 5.7: CNP challenge example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
(2011) provide acceptability judgments for non-island (Figure 5.8(a)) and island (Figure 5.8(b)
and Figure 5.8(c)) conditions that have equal-length dependencies. The authors use accept-
ability judgments to ﬁnd that the standard CNP island and the non-island have relatively equal
acceptability.
The authors provide a grammatical explanation for what they consider to be this atypical
behavior in Swedish. They claim that the apparent acceptability of CNPs is not evidence of the
constraint not existing, but rather behavior typical of verbs that take small clauses. The word
såg, “saw”, is a verb that takes a small-clause, and Kush and Lindahl argue that extraction
from islands within these verbs is easier than extraction from islands within verbs that do not
take a small clause, such as tr¨ affade, “meet”. Their hypothesis is born out by the acceptability
results: the non-small clause verb condition in Figure 5.8(c) is less acceptable.
This experiment is considered for the typical Swedish CNP island-violating behavior repre-
sented by the ﬁrst two conditions. To test the full Kush and Lindahl hypothesis, the treebank
was also modiﬁed to be sensitive to both small-clause and non-small clause verbs. There
were simply not enough data points to support the distinction and allow any of the cognitive
92hypotheses to distinguish the two. However, the acceptability of Swedish CNPs still stands as
a challenge to reductionist accounts: if there is something inherently difﬁcult about retrieving
a word across the CNP island, shouldn’t this difﬁculty exist across languages? Or, if there








































































































Figure 5.8: CNP challenge example 4: Swedish (measure: acceptability).
5.4 WHI
5.4.1 Classic
Like the classic example for CNPs, the classic example for WHIs is taken from a larger experi-
ment on WHI gradience from Hofmeister and Sag (2010). This experiment includes the classic
conditions demonstrating that extraction from a WHI is more difﬁcult than extraction from a
non-island (Figure 5.9). The results, shown in milliseconds of reading time, demonstrate that
extracting who from the island [whether they dismissed...] is more difﬁcult than extracting from



















































Figure 5.9: WHI classic example 1: English (measure: RT).
5.4.2 Gradience
Hofmeister and Sag (2010) also test ﬁller-type gradience, shown in Figure 5.10. They add a
condition, switching which employee for the bare who in Figure 5.10(b). The results are that
the which employee extraction is more acceptable than the bare extraction, although it is not as
acceptable as the non-island. This result lends support to the reductionist argument because














































































Figure 5.10: WHI gradience example 1: English (measure: RT).
As was mentioned in Section 5.3.3, Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) tested how embedding
interacts with islands in English, German, and Greek. The English and German conditions for
WHIs are replicated in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. The results, which are given as mean
acceptability judgments from ME, are as one would predict: more embedding means less
acceptability. This contrasts with the CNP results and lead the authors to argue that WHIs are
more suitable for a reductionist explanation. For our purposes, this level of gradience should












































































































Figure 5.12: WHI gradience example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
955.4.3 Challenges
Sprouse et al. (To Appear) consider WHIs in addition to the CNPs discussed in Section 5.3.3.
But, like the Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) data, the WHIs behave in keeping with reductionist
assumptions. Namely, in their experiment that tests the interaction of both length and syntactic
structure on WHIs, they ﬁnd that there is an interaction between the two (an island effect) as
well as individual effects for both length and syntactic structure. The conditions are provided
in Figure 5.13, and like the CNP study include a short non-island (Figure 5.13(a)), a short
island (Figure 5.13(b)), a long non-island (Figure 5.13(c)) and a long island (Figure 5.13(d)).
Unlike CNPs, though, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect on islands: acceptability is lower for the
short island condition than it is for the short non-island. Note that this is despite the fact that
there is no extraction from the short non-island. This experiment will likely pose a problem
for the retrieval-based cognitive constraints, which will not be able to differentiate the ﬁrst two





























































Figure 5.13: WHI challenge example 1: English (measure: acceptability).
Unlike the other types of syntactic locality, there are few examples that challenge reduc-
tionist accounts for WHIs, either experimentally or in the literature. One exception is Swedish,
where Maling and Zaenen (1982) report that speakers do not have difﬁculty with WHI extrac-
96tion. The conditions are provided in Figure 5.14, where the second sentence is an example
of a WHI violation but is reported as acceptable via syntactic judgments. This data poses a
challenge for reductionist accounts since the cognitive factors should behave similarly across
languages. However, note that although the conditions are matched for dependency length,
the syntactic structure is different. This difference could be a factor in the judgments reported


























































Figure 5.14: WHI challenge example 2: Swedish (measure: syntax).
5.5 SUV
5.5.1 Classic
The classic example for SUVs demonstrates the simple distinction that extracting a wh-word
past another wh-word is more difﬁcult than extracting a wh-word past a non wh-word. The
conditons come from Haider (2004) and are provided in Figure 5.15, where Figure 5.15(a)
shows a pronoun intervenor and Figure 5.15(b) shows a wh-intervenor. Note that all other
aspects of the sentence, including the syntactic structure and the dependency lengths, are































Figure 5.15: SUV classic example 1: English (measure: syntax).
5.5.2 Gradience
Gradience in SUVs has been reported for a long time (Karttunen, 1977). Arnon et al. (To
Appear) demonstrate gradience of both ﬁller and intervenor type in SUVs using RRT from a
self-paced reading task. Their conditions and their results are provided in Figure 5.16, where
the which-N ﬁller and intervenor yields the lowest RRT and least difﬁculty (Figure 5.16(a)),
and the bare ﬁller and intervenor yield the highest RRT and difﬁculty (Figure 5.16(d)). The
bare.which (Figure 5.16(b)) and the which.bare (Figure 5.16(c)) are intermediately difﬁcult, as





















































Figure 5.16: SUV gradience example 1: English (measure: RRT).
Although the RRTs reﬂect standard reductionist assumptions, the authors ran a simulta-
98neous acceptability judgment task that yields slightly different results. Here, the bare.which
condition is harder than the bare.bare condition. This result is precisely replicated by an ac-
ceptability judgment study from Fedorenko and Gibson (Submitted). Fedorenko and Gibson
do a parallel study testing availability of SUVs and gradience in SUVs in both English and
Russian. They ﬁnd an SUV effect in English, but this work considers the gradience effect,
replicated in Figure 5.17. The conditions are similar to Arnon et al. (To Appear), and the
bare.which condition is considered more difﬁcult than the bare.bare condition. Fedorenko and
Gibson (Submitted) note that because these results are from an ordinal acceptability judg-
ment task, the measure might be too coarse to give completely accurate results on this data














































































Figure 5.17: SUV gradience example 2: English (measure: acceptability).
Like the English studies, Featherston (2005) considers the effect of ﬁller and intervenor type
on German SUVs. But, he also considers three cases: nominative, accusative, and dative.
Featherston’s data suggests that the SUV condition holds in German. This work focuses on the
experimental conditions that show evidence of gradience in German, provided in Figure 5.18.
The German SUV ordering is markedly different from either of the English orderings, and
also goes against what reductionist hypotheses would predict. Here the easiest condition is
the bare.which (the most difﬁcult condition for Fedorenko and Gibson (Submitted)). This is
99followed by the which.which, the bare.bare, and the which.bare; the bare.bare condition is
therefore not the most difﬁcult. All told, this result runs counter to reductionist predictions, yet

























































































Figure 5.18: SUV gradience example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
5.5.3 Challenges
A challenge for not only the Featherston data but reductionist theories in general are the many
linguistic studies that claim that German speakers do not ﬁnd SUVs difﬁcult. A classic ex-
ample, using syntactic judgments, is provided by Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) and replicated in
Figure 5.19. Here, both the SUV in the second sentence and the non-SUV in the ﬁrst are rated
as acceptable.
Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) provide a follow-up to the Featherston (2005) study that argues
against the study’s main claims. They argue that what is driving the supposed SUV effect in
Featherston’s results is case rather than SUVs. They mention that German behaves unpre-
dictably when two animate dependents interact, and the additional dative dependent in the







































Figure 5.19: SUV challenge example 1: German (measure: syntax).
Fanselow and F´ ery suggest that SUVs should not be available in German because German
is verb-second. Because many of its verbs occur at the end of the sentence, speakers are
used to holding words in memory until the end of the sentence. Further, case-marking allows
speakers to keep thematic roles separate. They therefore design an ordinal, 7-point scale
acceptability judgment experiment that takes into account these factors; the conditions are
provided in Figure 5.20. An accusative SUV (Figure 5.20(a)) is compared to an accusative
non-SUV (Figure 5.20(b)), where the wh-intervenor wem “who” is switched to the personal
pronoun ihm “him”. And a dative SUV (Figure 5.20(c)) is compared to a dative non-SUV
(Figure 5.20(d)). The results support the long-standing conclusion that German does not have
SUVs: the SUV conditions (Figure 5.20(a) and Figure 5.20(c)) are considered more acceptable
than the non-SUV conditions. They also ﬁnd an effect of case: the dative conditions are more
difﬁcult than the accusative conditions. The authors conclude that the Featherston results are
difﬁcult to interpret because they do not take into account this effect of case on SUV behavior.
The Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) data poses a challenge to reductionist accounts because
it demonstrates cross-linguistic variability. Similarly, evidence suggests that Russian speakers
also do not ﬁnd SUVs difﬁcult. The Fedorenko and Gibson (Submitted) study has conditions
translated directly from its English counterpart, described in Section 5.5.2. The conditions
are provided in Figure 5.21, and include both the unextracted cases (non-SUVs) and the ex-
tracted cases described in the English study. The results are mean acceptability judgments,





















































































































































Figure 5.20: SUV challenge example 2: German (measure: acceptability).
acceptable. One thing to note is that the sentences have similarly high acceptability across
conditions, demonstrating that SUVs are not difﬁcult for Russian speakers. In fact, the most
acceptable condition is the bare.bare SUV condition, which for English would be very difﬁcult,
if not the most difﬁcult. Another surprising ﬁnding is that the ﬁller type does not have an effect
on Russian, even though it did have a statistically-signiﬁcant effect in English. Reductionist
accounts would predict that ﬁller-type should always be a factor in difﬁculty, regardless of lan-
guage. But, reductionists could also argue difﬁculty is obscured in easy sentences, particularly
for a coarse-grained measure like ordinal acceptability.
All together, the Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) German data and the Fedorenko and Gibson
(Submitted) Russian data pose a challenge for reductionist accounts. They demonstrate that
SUVs and even SUV gradience patterns do not behave similarly acroos languages. Although
these studies challenge reductionist accounts, they do not necessarily negate them. Rather, it
could be that typological factors, like case and verb-ﬁnal ordering, relieve processing difﬁculty
for these languages. With a broad-coverage model sensitive to frequency effects, the cognitive

















































































































































































Figure 5.21: SUV challenge example 3: Russian (measure: acceptability).
5.6 Experiments that were not modeled
One ﬁnal thing to note regarding the experiments selected above is that they do not represent
every linguistic judgment or experimental data point ever found for syntactic locality. Instead,
the focus is on experimental data that provides a mix of classic, gradient, and challenging data
for reductionist accounts. Many other experiments were considered but ultimately left out of
this discussion. Some were not considered because the dependency parser architecture could
not easily provide accurate results. For example, the tendency for long dependencies to have
higher difﬁculty than shorter dependencies, described in Chapter 4, would incorrectly provide
103positive results for studies with grossly mismatching dependency lengths between conditions,
such as syntactic judgments on Swedish CNPs and SUVs by Allwood (1982); Andersson
(1982); Engdahl (1982); Maling (1978), and English SUVs (Boˇ skovi´ c, 1998). For the Swedish
CNP data, these results were subsumed by an experimental result by Kush and Lindahl (2011).
Because Swedish SUVs behave similarly to German and Russian, the decision was made
to forego these studies altogether. Similarly, the English results were subsumed by other
experimental results.
Other experimental results were not considered because they were subsumed by larger
studies that use ﬁner-grained measures. For example, Keller (1996) studied the effects of def-
initeness on CNP islands using acceptability judgments. But, this study was subsumed by a
larger study by Hofmeister and Sag (2010), who used reading time data to ﬁnd no effect of
deﬁniteness. Also, Hofmeister (2007) reports results on SUV gradience that includes condi-
tions that are very similar to the Arnon et al. (To Appear) results; because these results do not
add to this discussion, this work focuses on the original Arnon results.
There is a challenge to reductionist accounts of SUVs not considered here. The argument
has been made that adding a third wh-intervenor to SUVs causes more acceptable sentences
(Kitahara, 1993; Reinhart, 1995). This result has since been overturned by Clifton et al. (2006),
who ﬁnd via an acceptability experiment that triple SUVs are, in fact, more difﬁcult.
Finally, this study does not consider arguably the most famous experimental result for is-
lands, from Stowe (1986). Stowe demonstrates that the parser does not consider attaching
a wh-word within a strong island. Her reading time-based experiment demonstrates that not
only is the attachment not made, it is not even considered by the parser. This result tests a
reductionist hypothesis, but is difﬁcult to model because the result argues against attachment.
The current model is therefore not able to accurately model her conditions, which is in keeping
with the argument that CNP may in fact be better explained by grammatical factors.
104Despite the various experiments that were left out, the studies modeled in this work pro-
vide a suitable cross-section of the syntactic locality data. It is hoped that the addition of the
categorical organization among the studies diminishes any potential loss in breadth.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the experimental data used test this cognitive model. The data not only
shows evidence for each of the syntactic locality phenomena, but it also shows experimental
evidence both for and against reductionist accounts. Although there are a variety of studies
tested, this work does not consider every experiment. Many were left out because they were
subsumed by studies that were more conducive to modeling, either because they used ﬁner-
grained measures or because the experimental conditions were better-matched. The next
chapter discusses how the experimental results are compared to parser difﬁculty.
105CHAPTER 6
A METHODOLOGY FOR COGNITIVE MODELING
6.1 Introduction
This work compares a cognitive model’s predicted difﬁculty to real human difﬁculty for syntactic
locality data. The results quanitify how well a particular cognitive factor models CNPs, WHIs,




























Figure 6.1: A sample graph comparing cognitive predictions to human difﬁculty.
Figure 6.1 provides explicitness previously unavailable for reductionist approaches of syntac-
tic locality. However, the large-scale nature of this study, taking into account many cognitive
factors, many phenomena, and many languages on broad-coverage model leads to complica-
tions. The following chapter outlines a methodology for cognitive modeling based on the tech-
niques and approaches required for this variable data set. Figure 6.2 diagrams the methodol-
ogy, which takes raw experimental results, translates them into dependency diagrams suitable
106for the computational model, runs them through a parser to obtain difﬁculty predictions for each
of the cognitive factors, and then allows for a comparison of these predictions to the human
data.
Section 6.2 describes how the experiments are translated into a parsable format that al-
lows for comparison to other experiments both within and across phenomena. Section 6.3























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.2: The evaluation process.
1086.2 Encoding practice
The discussion so far has focused on human acceptability: regardless of the measure used
to obtain the experimental results in Section 5.1, the focus of the discussion was on how ac-
ceptable human speakers found the conditions. The term acceptability glosses over an issue
with comparing experiments, and this is the difference between what the experiments actually
measure. For example, many syntactic judgments use binary acceptability, but the goal is to
measure grammaticality. Acceptability judgments are slightly more ﬁne-grained, and provide
either an ordinal or continuous scale upon which to measure acceptability. And ﬁne-grained
measures like reading time and RRT can provide insight into difﬁculty. But, these terms do not
always overlap in meaning: ungrammatical sentences are unacceptable, but not all unaccept-
able sentences are ungrammatical. A classic example, from Miller and Chomsky (1963), is the
sentence with multiple levels of embedding in (39). This sentence is unacceptable for English
speakers because it taxes working memory and is difﬁcult to process. Yet it is grammatical.
(39) The boy the dog the cat chewed chased laughed.
Complicating matters further, sentences can be difﬁcult without being either unacceptable
or ungrammatical. For example, object relative clauses are more difﬁcult than subject relative
clauses, but these sentence are both grammatical and acceptable for English speakers. (40)
and (41) show a classic example, from Grodner and Gibson (2005) where the object relative
clause in (41) is more difﬁcult than the subject relative clause in (40).
(40) The reporter who sent the photographer to the editor hoped for a story.
(41) The reporter who the photographer sent to the editor hoped for a story.
109Although grammaticality is a factor in acceptability, it is not the whole story: a multitude
of processing factors can also be at play. And although unacceptability and difﬁculty usually
co-occur, they do not always do so. The experimental measures considered can not reliably
differentiate between these factors, and although the experiments themselves are usually de-
signed to do so, comparing across experiments leads to problems. How can one compare
a syntactic study that argues a sentence is ungrammatical from a reading time study arguing
that a particular region is difﬁcult? This is not a new problem (Miller & Chomsky, 1963; Cowart,
1997; Featherston, 2005; Clifton et al., 2006; Featherston, 2009).
The focus of this research is measuring difﬁculty, as that is the quantity that the com-
plexity measures from the parser give. It is also reliably available in the syntactic locality
data considered here: islands and SUVs are difﬁcult; whether this arises from acceptability or
grammaticality is a controversial matter. Gradience, be it in acceptability judgments or reading
times, can not draw the line between acceptable sentences and unacceptable sentences, or
grammatical sentences or ungrammatical sentences. But, gradience can provide information
on which sentences are more difﬁcult than others.
This remainder of this section discusses how this work encodes the experimental data
to bring into focus the difﬁculty associated with syntactic locality, and turn it into a format
that can be compared to the parser’s difﬁculty. Section 6.2.1 describes how to assign the
sentences dependency analyses, and Section 6.2.2 discusses how the central point of difﬁculty
is identiﬁed as one particular dependency arc for each sentence.
6.2.1 Assigning dependency analyses to experimental sentences
The parser builds dependency analyses of sentences. But, it is also possible to assign a de-
pendency analysis to sentences by hand, and then use the parser to simply provide the com-
110plexity measure results for that particular dependency analysis. This assigned dependency
analysis is the gold-parse, or the analysis that is correct from a grammatical perspective. Con-
sider the Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) conditions for WHIs in English, which are repeated
below in Figure 6.3. The dependency analyses assigned follow from standard dependency
grammar rules: verbs are the root of the dependency analysis. For islands and SUVs, the



















































Figure 6.3: A WHI gradience example. Measure: acceptability.
For ambiguous or controversial decisions, such as whether to follow determiner phrase
rules or noun phrase rules, the practices in the treebanks were followed. Although this allows
the parser to get probabilities from the standards that are set by the treebank, a complication
arises when treebanks make different decisions. For example, the Brown corpus for English
uses embedded verbs as the heads of relative clauses, whereas the Russian Treebank uses
the complementizer as the head of the relative clause. Because this variation did not directly
effect syntactic locality processing, treebank procedures were used rather than attempt to
standardize across languages.
111An issue that does effect the modeling of syntactic locality is the NP analysis of noun
phrases common to the treebanks, where the noun is the head of the determiner. Many of the
experiments test which-noun ﬁller gradience, and in this case it is the wh-phrase that should be
retrieved from memory, not the noun itself. All which-noun phrases were switched so that which
was the head of the noun, and the dependent of the verb. This had the added beneﬁt of helping
interference features, since retrieving which interferes with other wh-words, but retrieving its
noun does not. One negative to this transformation is that it made dependency lengths for
which-noun conditions longer than bare conditions. More details on this transformation are
available in Chapter 4.4.1. More details on why longer dependency lengths can be a problem
are available in Chapter 4.7.
The dependency analysis assigned to a sentence is based on the standards set by the
treebanks and their head-ﬁnders. This provides a standard grammar across experiments; the
next section discusses how to compare them.
6.2.2 Determining the crucial arcs
This research considers two parser-based complexity metrics, surprisal and retrieval, for com-
parison with human difﬁculty. One issue is that these metrics are not full-sentence measures:
both give difﬁculty measures that correspond to words within a sentence. Although they could
be converted to sentence-long measures, this doesn’t capture the essence of syntactic local-
ity. Whether from a grammatical perspective or from a processing perspective, the problem
that syntactic locality addresses is assigning the fronted wh-word to its proper place, which for
dependency grammar would be as the dependent of its verb. Creating this attachment is what
is difﬁcult: grammatical approaches argue that it is because of barriers to movement, such
as islands or superiority constraints, and reductionist approaches argue that it has to do with
correctly retrieving the word and attaching it.
112For this reason, this crucial dependency between the extracted wh-phrase and its head
verb is identiﬁed as the focal point of difﬁculty for the sentence. In particular, the region of
interest will be at the head verb after the dependency is formed. For experimental measures
like reading time, this makes sense: the region of interest for the reading time spike is at
the head verb as well. For measures like acceptability and syntactic judgments, an argument
can be made that the unacceptability and/or difﬁculty is also being driven by difﬁculty at the
integration region. The reading time studies that have been done conﬁrm this. Sentence-
wide difﬁculty measures for acceptability and syntactic judgments are therefore assigned to
the head verb of the crucial arc. This would be ﬁre in the Alexopoulou & Keller examples in
Figure 6.3.
This crucial dependency is by necessity created after attaching other dependents of the
verb that occur after the wh-word. The verb therefore often has a high surprisal or retrieval
time that could be due to other attachments. But this helps the parser be a more accurate
model–syntactic locality difﬁculty does not occur in a vacuum, and the experimental measures
are likely taking this difﬁculty into account as well.
Another issue is that any difﬁculty that is coming from structure built after this attachment
can not be considered by the parser. The Sprouse et al. (To Appear) data in Chapter 5.3.3 and
Chapter 5.4.2 demonstrates why this could be problematic, as the island structure appears
after the dependency for some conditions. However, because this model tests integration-
based cognitive constraints, this is not considered a shortcoming of the model, but rather of
the particular cognitive constraints.
1136.3 Evaluation process
Evaluating a cognitive model is a complicated task; not only are there the multiple experiments
and experimental methods to contend with, but also the multiple phenomena, the multiple
languages, and the various cognitive factors that will be tested. But at the larger scale, there
is simply no consistent method for evaluating cognitive models as there is in other areas of
computational linguistics research. Keller (2010) argues that this can be rectiﬁed in the future
by developing a standard test set for comparison against psycholinguistic data. This will allow
for better, quantitative evaluation methods against psycholinguistic data. Because this is not
yet available, particularly for a study such as this one, this work relies on standard qualitative
evaluation: cognitive factors that assign difﬁculty in an order similar to the human order are
considered accurate models.
This section focuses on the procedure that allows the parser’s difﬁculty measures to be
compared to the human difﬁculty measures. Figure 6.4 provides a diagram of this evaluation
process; this section steps through the diagram to demonstrate how cognitive factors can be
compared to human difﬁculty for syntactic locality.
6.3.1 1  Transform into dependency analyses
The process of turning the experimental data into dependency analyses is detailed in Sec-
tion 5.1 and Section 6.2. In brief, the sentences are assigned dependency analyses using
standards set by the treebanks and the headﬁnder rules described in Chapter 4.4.1. For each
sentence, the crucial arc is found between the extracted wh-word and its verbal head, and the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.4: 1 Transform into dependency analysis. 2 Run through the parser. 3 Ob-
tain difﬁculty measures for each cognitive factor. 4 Transform into percentage
difﬁculty by condition. 5 Compare to human difﬁculty.
1156.3.2 2  Run through the parser
The parser has two modes: in one, the cognitive factors are tested on how accurately they
create the dependency analysis that is most like the one that we think humans are creating.
Or, the parser can be given the correct dependency analysis, and the cognitive factors are
tested on the difﬁculty they assign to that analysis at a particular region, like the verb. This
work considers this second mode1. The result of the second mode is a series of difﬁculty
measures for each of the words in the experimental sentences. These are described further
in the next section.
6.3.3 3  Obtain difﬁculty measures for each cognitive factor
The result of running the dependency analyses through the parser is a series of surprisal and
retrieval values for each word in each of the sentences in each of the experiments. Each of the
cognitive factors is translated into a probabilistic model. Surprisal values are then generated
for these factors. Surprisal takes into account how the probabilities change as the sentence
is parsed: if the probability space goes down once a word is parsed, like the head verb of a
wh-extraction, it indicates an area of high surprisal, or high difﬁculty. If the probability space
remains relatively equal or even goes higher, its indicates low surprisal and therefore low
difﬁculty. Because the probability space is different for each of the cognitive factors, their
surprisal values will also be different. The goal is to determine which cognitive factors make
the parser sensitive to difﬁculty that is similar to the difﬁculty evident in the experimental data.
The other complexity metric is itself a cognitive hypothesis. Retrieval (Lewis & Vasishth,
2005) does not depend on the probability space of the parser; rather, it factors in the difﬁculty
of retrieving an item from memory, like the extracted wh-element, and then attaching it to its
1See Chapter 4.8 for details.
116head verb. The output is a time, in milliseconds, of how long it takes to process a word.
As has been discussed throughout this section, the focus of difﬁculty is the head verb of
the extracted wh-element. Therefore, for each cognitive factor, the difﬁculty that it assigns to
an experimental condition will be the surprisal or retrieval value it assigns to the head verb of
the extracted wh-element. As can be seen in the diagram, the surprisal values can vary greatly
across conditions.
This is not the only way to calculate surprisal and retrieval for the experimental conditions.
For example, one could localize difﬁculty to the particular action of making the arc between the
wh-element and its head verb. But, none of the experimental measures are nearly this local; in
fact, reading time is the ﬁnest-grained experimental measure we consider, and it can only ﬁnd
difﬁculty at the word, at best. Therefore, the focus will be on difﬁculty at the verb, including any
other difﬁculty associated with building its other dependents and processing it. Further details
on the surprisal and retrieval implementations are available in Chapter 4.6.
6.3.4 4  Transform into percentage difﬁculty by condition
The surprisal or retrieval scores for each of the conditions and each of the cognitive factors
vary greatly, both across conditions (some factors assign lower surprisals than others) and
across measures (surprisal values, retrieval values, and the various experimental measures
have different scales). These differences can obscure the major experimental ﬁndings: syn-
tactic locality violations are difﬁcult. These numbers are therefore converted into percentages
of difﬁculty for each experiment. This percentage is calculated by adding up the difﬁculty
assigned by a particular cognitive factor to each of an experiment’s conditions. This total difﬁ-
culty is then divided by each condition’s difﬁculty, giving what percentage of the total difﬁculty
that cognitive factor assigns to that sentence. Taking the SBI data for the Alexopoulou and
117Keller experiment, shown in 4 of Figure 6.4, the surprisal values show that SBI assigns 62%
difﬁculty to the most difﬁcult sentence, whereas it only assigns 1% difﬁculty to the baseline.
6.3.5 5  Compare to human difﬁculty
Now that the percentage of difﬁculty that each of the cogntive factors assign to the experimen-
tal conditions is calculated, this quantity is compared to the percentage difﬁculty that humans
assign to the experimental conditions. The same technique is used to get this percentage as
for the cognitive factors: the difﬁculty across conditions is added to get the experiment total,
and then each individual condition is divided from the total to get a percentage difﬁculty.
For acceptability and RRT some of the data is negative. For example, the two most difﬁcult



















































Figure 6.5: A WHI gradience example. Measure: acceptability.
One possible solution is to take the lowest number, in this case -0.14, and add its absolute
value to all conditions. This makes the most difﬁcult condition 0, and the best condition 0.52.
118It is preferable to have the least difﬁcult condition the lower number, and the most difﬁcult
conditions the higher number, to match the surprisal and retrieval predictions. Therefore, the
highest number is added to the negative value of each of the conditions, as in Equation 6.1.
Equations 6.2 through 6.4 demonstrate how this works for the Alexopoulou & Keller sentences.
Now the data is arranged so that the most acceptable condition has the lowest percentage of
difﬁculty, and the least acceptable condition the highest.
Sentence difﬁculty =  sentence difﬁculty + experimental lowest value (6.1)
Alexopoulou & Keller Sentence 1 =  0:38 + 0:38
= 0:0
(6.2)
Alexopoulou & Keller Sentence 2 =  ( 0:05) + 0:38
= 0:43
(6.3)
Alexopoulou & Keller Sentence 3 =  ( 0:14) + 0:38j
= 0:52
(6.4)
One argument against this transformation is that it could be obscuring some aspect of the
results. For example, the most acceptable condition will alway have 0% difﬁculty, even if this
isn’t the case given the acceptability judgments. However this is likely not a problem because
the percentages are not directly compared. Instead, the order of the sentences, in terms of
difﬁculty, is compared.
The graph shown after step 5 , in larger scale in Figure 6.6, demonstrates this compar-
ison. Percentage difﬁculty is provided along the x axis, and each of the measures are along
the y axis, with the human difﬁculty on the top line, and the cognitive factors ordered by how
well they predict the ordering. Each of the conditions are featured with a symbol along the x
119axis. In this case, the easiest condition, Sentence 1, is represented by a blue circle. Sentence
3, the most difﬁcult condition, is a yellow triangle. Retrieval performs the best because it ﬁnds
the most difference between the most difﬁcult and least difﬁcult conditions. In fact, for this
data set, all of the cognitive factors get the correct order, and are therefore able to model the
empirical difﬁculty ordering that was observed in the experiment. This is evident because the
dashed line is at the bottom of the graph; normally, this dashed line appears somewhere in the




























Figure 6.6: The result of the evaluation process is a graph comparing cognitive predictions to
human difﬁculty.
One issue that comes up with determining a correct model by this ordering is that some
cognitive factors could assign relatively equal percentage difﬁculty to conditions, but do so
in the correct order. For example, in a syntactic judgment, the acceptable sentence is rated
as 0% difﬁculty and the unacceptable sentence is rated as 100% difﬁculty. A cognitive factor
could assign difﬁculty such that the acceptable sentence has 49% difﬁculty and the unaccept-
able sentence has 51% difﬁculty, and still get the correct ordering and be said to model the
sentence. Although an argument can be made that this does not correctly model the sentence,
120for the purposes here even these close calls are considered correct models. The reason is
that it is unclear where to draw the line, and how this would relate to actual human difﬁculty.
Given the coarse-grained syntactic judgment, it is difﬁcult to assign a percentage difﬁculty that
accurately reﬂects speaker intuitions. Is 60% difﬁculty okay? Is 40% difﬁculty not okay? Be-
cause this area is ambiguous, relative ordering is used. It will be noted in the results section
when this issue comes up.
This evaluation procedure allows for a comparison of the difﬁculty that cognitive factors
assign and the difﬁculty that humans assign to syntactic locality. Cognitive factors that assign
difﬁculty in an order similar to the human order are considered accurate models. Cognitive
factors that don’t are not.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter outlines a methodology for comparing a cognitive model to a variety of exper-
imental measures for syntactic locality. The comparison is qualitative; there simply are not
enough results in one study to allow for quantitative analysis, and the methods for quantitative
analysis remain undeﬁned. But, this evaluation procedure focuses on determining how to do




This chapter presents an analysis of cognitive theory predictions for syntactic locality on a
working sentence processing model. Each phenomenon was tested against the cognitive
theory predictions, which are encoded as probabilistic features within the dependency parser.
The results demonstrate that cognitive factors model weak and non-island locality. However,
they do not model the strong island data. This encourages a rethinking of syntactic locality,
and the competence-performance divide.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the parser’s performance on
each individual experiment. Section 7.3 aggregates the individual results by phenomenon to
investigate differences between strong, weak, and non-island locality. Section 7.4 discusses
the broad implications of these results, including insights on weaknesses and strengths of the
methodology. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Results by study
7.2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 6, a difﬁculty in modeling cross-linguistic data is the amount of exper-
imental variation, in terms of methodology, practices, and even measures. This section details
the parser’s performance on the individual experiments, which will then be aggregated across
experiments and phenomena in Section 7.3. The results are organized by phenomenon, with
122discussion of CNP studies in Section 7.2.2, WHI studies in Section 7.2.3, and SUV studies in
Section 7.2.4. Further details on the individual studies are provided in Chapter 5.
7.2.2 CNP
CNP strong islands offer little variation and gradience within English, and challenge reduction-
ist accounts with evidence from Swedish. They represent the most difﬁcult syntactic locality
phenomenon for reductionist theories to explain, and this is further supported by the results
reported here. Although some features can distinguish the classic island cases in English, the
features perform poorly on the gradient and challenging data. This result does not support
an account for syntactic locality based on these integration-based reductionist hypotheses,
leading to the possibility that strong islands are indeed grammatical phenomena. Section 7.4
discusses the implications of this result. The following sections provide details on the parser’s
performance for classic, gradient, and challenging experiments.
Classic
Although there are many syntactic examples that demonstrate the difﬁculty of extraction from
CNP islands in English, the classic example used here comes from an experiment by Hofmeister
and Sag (2010), repeated in Figure 7.1. This experiment includes the most well-matched con-
ditions for English CNPs. Here, the island-case in Figure 7.1(b) is only one word longer than
the non-island, and all other words are the same1. Even though the conditions nearly match,
the residual reading time (RRT) at captured is lower for the CNP island in Figure 7.1(b), indi-
cating that the sentence is less acceptable than the base condition in Figure 7.1(a)2.
1See Chapter 4.7 for a full description of why dependency distance can sometimes affect modeling results.

































































Figure 7.1: CNP classic example 1: English (measure: RRT).
Several features do in fact get the distinction between the island and non-island condition,
as shown in Figure 7.2(a). This graph shows the percentage of difﬁculty that a particular
feature assigns to each of the sentential conditions in the experiment3. The top line shows
the human result: in this case, the second sentence (corresponding to the second sentence
in Figure 7.1) is more difﬁcult, and is given a higher percentage of the difﬁculty. The following
lines list each of the cognitive factors, ordered by degree of difference between the conditions.
The dashed line separates those features that ﬁnd Sentence 2 more difﬁcult than Sentence 1




























Figure 7.2: Full CNP classic results.
3Further details on how the percentage difﬁculty is calculated are provided in Chapter 6.3.4.
124The best-performing memory factor is Intervenors because it rates the difﬁculty for Sen-
tence 2 higher than the other features. But, note that the difference between Sentence 1 and
Sentence 2 is not large. The experimental difference in RRT between the two sentences is
similarly not large, or at least not as large as one would expect for a grammatical distinction.
Although this could follow from the experimental settings, the relatively similar difﬁculty rating,
hovering at 50% for all factors, indicates that this experiment is not easily modeled by these
cognitive factors. However, for the purposes of this work and as discussed in Chapter 6.3,
any constraint that predicts the correct ordering (i.e., is listed above the line) is considered an
accurate model of the experiment.
Considering only these cognitive constraints, it is not surprising that Intervenors and DLT
gets this distinction. After all, the second sentence introduces another noun, or intervenor.
Similarly, Distance gets the distinction because the extra noun makes the dependency length
longer, leading to more difﬁculty in the second sentence. Retrieval only has a few milliseconds
difference between the two conditions, but it is in the right direction. This follows from the
activation equation for the retrieval theory.
The other features either do not distinguish between the two sentences or ﬁnd the second
sentence easier than the ﬁrst. This may be because the sentences are too well-matched, or
because the human acceptability differences are not pronounced enough. But, given the other
experiments for CNPs considered here, the most likely cause is that strong islands are not
easily modeled by these performance factors.
Although some cognitive constraints can model this classic example, this may not be be-
cause CNP island violations follow from the cognitive hypotheses themselves. Rather, this
may be a result of the tendency for longer dependencies to be more difﬁcult, as discussed in
Chapter 4.7. There is a length difference between the conditions that is likely aiding the higher
difﬁculty for Sentence 2. This explanation is further supported by the remaining results.
125Gradience
The Hofmeister and Sag (2010) data discussed in the previous section is part of a larger exper-
iment that tests whether CNP islands are subject to gradience. The experimental conditions
are replicated in Figure 7.3, where conditions vary based on the ﬁller type (bare or which-Noun)
and the deﬁniteness of the head noun (indeﬁnite, deﬁnite, or plural). The ﬁndings indicate that
there is a sensitivity to ﬁller type, but not head-noun deﬁniteness, with which-N type ﬁllers be-
ing easier than bare ﬁllers like who. Note that Figure 7.3(c) and Figure 7.3(e) are the classic
examples from the previous section; compared to the other experimental conditions, they are
not the easiest and most difﬁcult conditions. However, the overall result indicates that there is









































































































































































































































Figure 7.3: CNP gradience example 1: English (measure: RRT).
Figure 7.4(a), however, suggests otherwise. No cognitve factor models the human-like
126acceptability patterns. Further, the seven conditions have a relatively even difﬁculty distribution
across all factors, particularly when compared to the human data. This could be because the
deﬁniteness part of the experiment is obscuring the syntactic locality issue. To test this, a






























































Figure 7.4: Full CNP gradience results.
This experiment, from Keller (1996), only considers ﬁller-type gradience. The experiment
provides acceptability ratings for various extracted ﬁller-types from CNP islands, shown in
Figure 7.5. Unlike Hofmeister and Sag, the which-N condition is considered less acceptable
than the bare condition, Figure 7.5(a).
Unfortunately, the cognitive constraints now ﬁnd the pattern from the Hofmeister and Sag
experiment, and the bare condition is harder than the which-N condition in Figure 7.4(b). The
cognitive constraints perform well on the other sentences: the which-N and what conditions,
Sentences 2 and 3, have similar difﬁculty, and the how condition is hardest. However, the bare
who condition (Sentence 1) is not ordered correctly, and the cognitive constraints are not able









































































































Figure 7.5: CNP gradience example 2: English (measure: acceptability).
There are two possible explanations for the different orderings of the which-N and who
conditions in the experiments. One explanation is that the varying gradience is a result of
different experimental measures: RRT is more sensitive than acceptability, and acceptability
may be too coarse a measure to provide accurate results. In this case, the Hofmeister and Sag
ordering should be considered more accurate, and it is possible that an RRT experiment of the
Keller conditions would support the ordering from the cognitive constraints. However, it could
also be the case that these sentences are difﬁcult for English speakers, and any variation in
acceptability does not reﬂect true gradience. This is further discussed in Section 7.4. For the
time being, no cognitive factor can model either of the gradience experiments.
Challenges
The CNP gradience studies are not modeled by the cognitive constraints, indicating that an
integration-based reductionist hypothesis for this type of syntactic locality is not possible. The
following experiments, which are meant to challenge the cognitive constraints, provide fur-
ther evidence against a reductionist explanation. The cognitive constraint do not model these
128results either.
The ﬁrst experiment, from Sprouse et al. (To Appear), provides acceptability ratings from
an experiment that tests both distance and islandhood in a 2 x 2 design. The sentences
are shown in Figure 7.6, with Figure 7.6(a) showing a short non-island, Figure 7.6(b) a short





































































Figure 7.6: CNP challenge example 1: English (measure: acceptability).
Each of the features gets the distinction between the long-distance island and the long-
distance non-island. However, it should be noted that this is not surprising since in terms of
number of words, the second sentence is longer. The distinction between the short island and
non-island is small but statistically-signiﬁcant for English speakers, yet the parser does not
ﬁnd any difference. The cognitive constraints get the distinction between the short and long
dependency lengths, but this falls out from the parser architecture.
The cognitive constraints also perform poorly on the other challenging experiments. Alexopoulou
and Keller (2007) test how the level of embedding effects CNPs in English and German. The
sentences are provided in Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 respectively. The acceptability judgments
indicate that there is a difference between islands and non-islands in both languages. But,


















































































































Figure 7.7: Full CNP challenge results.
singly-embedded islands.
As Figure 7.7(b) and Figure 7.7(c) demonstrate, the parsing model performs according to






















































































































Figure 7.9: CNP challenge example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
difﬁcult. Therefore, none of the constraints accurately model this data.
Data from Swedish has long caused problems for both grammatical and cognitive accounts
of CNP islands because Swedish speakers do not ﬁnd this extraction unacceptable. The Kush
131and Lindahl (2011) study provides acceptability judgments demonstrating extraction from CNP
islands is not as difﬁcult as it is for English speakers. The sentences in Figure 7.10 show three
cases: the ﬁrst has extraction from a non-island, the second has extraction from an island, and
the third has extraction from a complex-NP headed by a “non-small-clause” verb. Kush and
Lindahl’s grammatical explanation centers on this distinction: extraction from CNP islands is
acceptable when the CNP is headed by a verb that takes a small clause. Their acceptability
judgments support this claim, as Figure 7.10(b) has a high acceptability rating. However,








































































































Figure 7.10: CNP challenge example 4: Swedish (measure: acceptability).
The results from the parser can not provide evidence against Kush and Lindahl’s grammat-
ical argument. Figure 7.7(d) demonstrates that the parser not only ﬁnds a difference between
the ﬁrst and second cases, but it is unable to tell the difference between the small clause and
non-small clause verbs. This is despite the fact that the treebank was modiﬁed to distinguish
small-clause taking and non-small clause taking verbs4. Overall, this result indicates that the
integration-based cognitive cognitive constraints can not handle the Swedish data.
The CNP island results demonstrate that although cognitive features can model the human
4See Chapter 4.4.1 for further details on treebank preparation.
132pattern of difﬁculty in the classic case, this is likely driven by a word-number mismatch in the
experimental conditions. Further, the difﬁculty values are so slight that they do not adequately
model the well-documented patterns of unacceptability for these sentences. The inability of
cognitive constraints to model the CNP island data is particularly noticeable when compared
to their much better performance with WHIs, detailed in the next section.
7.2.3 WHI
The cognitive factors are able to consistently model a series of experiments for WHIs, includ-
ing a range of classic, gradient, and challenging examples. The WHI experimental conditions
are correctly matched in terms of words, so that any apparent modeling is not coming from
a distance factor, as was the case in the last section. The classic case in Figure 7.11, pro-
vided by Hofmeister and Sag (2010), demonstrates. Reading time for the non-island condition,



















































Figure 7.11: WHI classic example 1: English (measure: RT).
Retrieval performs best on this experiment, which is in keeping with Hofmeister and Sag’s
argument that extraction from WHIs is difﬁcult speciﬁcally because of a memory retrieval issue.
Interferers and Filler also perform well; for Interferers, this is expected because whether
interferes with the retrieval of who. For Filler, it is less understandable why it can distinguish
between the two. It may be that the addition of whether provides some perturbation in the
probability space, making the overall probability lower than it is for that.
As expected, the activation features perform poorly, as does DLT because it doesn’t take
133into account wh-intervenors like whether. It is surprising that the probabilistic ProbRetrieval
feature does not perform well, although this could simply be due to some probabilistic anomolies
rather than the theory itself. Further, SBI is not strong enough to get the distinction well–
although the second sentence is harder, it’s not harder by much and is more equal. Overall,



























Figure 7.12: Full WHI classic results.
Gradience
Evidence that demonstrates gradience in WHIs is crucial for supporting cognitive explanations
of weak islands. This gradience can be in terms of ﬁller-type, as Hofmeister and Sag (2010)
134demonstrate with their experiment in Figure 7.13. Here, the which theory example is easier to














































































Figure 7.13: WHI gradience example 1: English (measure: RT).
Unfortunately, the parser is unable to get this result. It ﬁnds the which-N condition harder
than the bare condition for all of the cognitive theories. The baseline condition is easiest,
as predicted. This problem may be a result of the tendency for the parser to ﬁnd longer
dependencies more difﬁcult, which would be the case for the which-N conditions as they have
an extra noun. This possibility is further discussed in relation to SUV gradience.
Other evidence for gradience in WHIs comes from Alexopoulou and Keller (2007). Like
the CNP experiments, they test how embedding affects acceptability in English and German
islands. In this case, the doubly embedded island is more difﬁcult than the singly embedded is-
land, which is in turn more difﬁcult than the baseline non-island for both languages (Figure 7.15
and Figure 7.16).
This result follows from cognitive explanations, and as expected, all of the factors perform
well on the English and German examples. The doubly-embedded structure is hardest, and
the baseline is easiest. In combination with the Alexopoulou and Keller result for CNPs, this
result supports the authors’ claims that reductionist accounts are better models of weak islands






















































































Figure 7.14: Full WHI gradience results.
Challenges
As with the CNP island example, the Sprouse et al. experiment for WHIs is a challenge for












































































































Figure 7.16: WHI gradience example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
it includes a distinction between short islands (Figure 7.17(b)) and short non-islands (Fig-
ure 7.17(b)) that can not be accounted for by integration-based theories. Although the parser
is able to model the distinction between long islands and non-islands, shown in Figure 7.18(a),
its inability to get this distinction demonstrates a potential problem with these reductionist hy-
potheses of WHIs. Although integration affects are sufﬁcient for the majority of the results,






















































































































Figure 7.18: Full WHI challenge results.
Another piece of evidence that should cause problems for cognitive accounts is from
Swedish. Like CNPs, Swedish seems to have relatively even acceptability judgments for ex-
traction from island and non-island contexts, as shown in Figure 7.19. Here, Figure 7.19(b)
is an island, but given syntactic judgments, it is perfectly acceptable. The reason this would
138be a problem for cognitive accounts is because the same cognitive factors (interference, re-
trieval difﬁculty, activation distance) should be at play in Swedish as they are in English, and


























































Figure 7.19: WHI challenge example 2: Swedish (measure: syntax).
Yet, one of the more suprising results is that the cognitive factors in fact ﬁnd the Swedish
island context easier than the non-island context, as shown in Figure 7.18(b). The only factor
that does not is Retrieval, which is likely due to the interference issue. However, in the cases of
the probabilistic constraints, the interference appears to be over-ridden by frequency effects.
This result indicates this Swedish example is either not an island, or there is something in
the treebank frequencies that makes it easier to maintain the dependency across this island
context.
These results demonstrate that cognitive factors model the classic, gradient, and challeng-
ing data. There are some anomolies, like the Hofmeister and Sag ﬁller gradience experiment,
but this could be explained by architectural issues. The cognitive factors are robust enough
to model the Swedish experimental data, which does not directly follow from the cognitive
hypotheses. This demonstrates the usefulness of an explicit computational model for these
cases.
1397.2.4 SUV
Unlike CNPs and WHIs, grammar-based accounts do not attribute SUV ungrammaticality to
a phrase-marker barrier. Instead, the ungrammaticality is thought to arise from semantic or
discourse issues (Szabolcsi & Zwarts, 1993). As discussed in Chapter 2.6, many of these the-
ories incorporate aspects of interference without explicitly naming performance issues. There-
fore, of the three constructs, cognitive theories should perform best on SUVs. In fact, factors
that incorporate interference model the majority of the studies, whereas activation-based fac-
tors perform worse.
Classic
Consider the classic example, taken from Haider (2004) and displayed in Figure 7.20. Haider’s
syntactic judgments demonstrate that in the case where an intervening wh-word who replaces































Figure 7.20: SUV classic example 1: English (measure: syntax).
The results, in Figure 7.21(a), demonstrate that Retrieval, Interferers, and SBI all ﬁnd the
second sentence more difﬁcult than the ﬁrst. The activation-based features, Distance and De-
cay, are not able to distinguish the two sentences, and some features, including probabilistic
ProbRetrieval, ﬁnd the SUV to be easier than the non-SUV. It may seem surprising that the
two retrieval factors make different predictions, but this is likely due to the addition of frequency
140information to the ProbRetrieval constraint. These differences between the retrieval implemen-




























Figure 7.21: Full SUV classic results.
Gradience
The Haider data is syntactic, and it only demonstrates that SUVs are more difﬁcult than non-
SUVs. One of the most interesting things about SUVs is the often gradient behavior they ex-
hibit. Just as with CNPs and WHIs, experimental evidence from Arnon et al. (To Appear) sug-
gests that informative ﬁllers are more acceptable than bare ﬁllers. Figure 7.22 shows the ex-
perimental conditions. Notice that in this experiment, the bare.bare condition (Figure 7.22(d))
is harder than the bare.which condition; both more informative ﬁllers and intervenors are more
acceptable than bare.
Figure 7.24(a) shows the cognitive predictions. The cognitive constraints have difﬁculty





















































Figure 7.22: SUV gradience example 1: English (measure: RRT).
fore there will be more words between which and its verbal head. For many of these features,
Sentence 1 is in fact the most difﬁcult. A possible solution to this problem is to condense which-
noun phrases into one word, so that which device, for example, would be headed by a single
POS tag “WDT-WHICH-NOUN”. But, this engineering ﬁx could compromise the integrity of the
cognitive model, and requires more testing. Further details on the link between dependency
length and surprisal are available in Chapter 4. For now, this issue causes serious problems
for a set of data that should be relatively easy for integration-based reductionist hypotheses.
The Fedorenko and Gibson (Submitted) experiment tests the same gradience as Arnon
et al. (To Appear), but gets a different acceptability ordering. The sentences in Figure 7.23
show that which patient in Figure 7.23(a) and Figure 7.23(b) is more acceptable than who in
Figure 7.23(c) and Figure 7.23(d).
Unfortunately, the cognitive theories are unable to replicate this ordering as well, as shown
in Figure 7.24(b). Sentence 1, the condition with the longest dependency, is considered easier
than the bare.bare and the bare.which conditions for all features in both experiments. Neither













































































Figure 7.23: SUV gradience example 2: English (measure: acceptability).
insight into which ordering is best from the cognitive perspective. It should be noted, however,
that this is caused by a shortcoming of the parser, and not of the cognitive constraints.
A ﬁnal experiment that demonstrates SUV gradience is from Featherston (2005), who re-
ports data demonstrating German gradience based on the informativeness of the ﬁller (Fig-
ure 7.25). This experimental result, based on acceptability judgments, is controversial because
it negates long-standing linguistic data suggesting that Germans do not ﬁnd SUVs ungram-
matical. However, this experiment not only found evidence for SUVs, but also found that SUV
acceptability is highly variable depending on the case and the ﬁller-type. For example, the least
acceptable condition is when an accusative which-N ﬁller is extracted past a nominative bare
intervenor, Figure 7.25(h). The most acceptable condition is when a bare accusative is ex-
tracted past a nominative which-N intervenor. The reported acceptability ratings demonstrate
that these differences are strong.
Like the English gradience data, the parser does not get the correct patterns here (Fig-
ure 7.24(c)). Unlike the English data, though, the parser does not ﬁnd much variation among
the conditions. For the features as well as the Retrieval measure, these sentences have the
same range of difﬁculty. A few features get the main pattern that the ﬁrst condition is less
























































































Figure 7.24: Full SUV gradience results.
Taken together, these results for gradience experiments are not promising for a cognitive
account of SUVs. However, something curious happens with the next set of data points that

















































































































































































Figure 7.25: SUV gradience example 3: German (measure: acceptability).
Challenges
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Featherston (2005) experiment is considered
controversial because it goes against long-standing evidence that German does not have
SUVs. A typical example promoting this latter viewpoint is provided by Fanselow and F´ ery
(2007), repeated below in Figure 7.26. Here, the SUV context in Figure 7.26(b) is considered
of equal grammaticality as the non-SUV context.







































Figure 7.26: SUV challenge example 1: German (measure: syntax).
SUV context to be of equal or lesser difﬁculty to the non-SUV context (Figure 7.27(a)). Once
again, the parser does not ﬁnd much variation between SUVs and non-SUVs, supporting the
linguistic position that there are no German SUVs. The only exception is Intervenors, which
makes sense because there is an extra intervenor.
Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) suggest that the gradience in the Featherston (2005) experi-
ment may be caused by case rather than actual SUV unacceptability and gradience. They
design a 2 x 2 experiment wherein case and SUV are manipulated, but the conditions have
equal dependency lengths. Their results demonstrate that when case is matched, the SUV
conditions (Figure 7.28(a) and Figure 7.28(c)) are actually more acceptable than their case-
matched counterparts (Figure 7.28(b) and Figure 7.28(d)) respectively.
And interestingly enough, this result is modeled by the SBI feature. Abstracting away from
the slight acceptability differences between the SUV and non-SUV contexts, all of the features
ﬁnd the broad pattern of results for case. This overall pattern of results is interesting: the
cognitive constraints should not be able to simultaneously predict difﬁculty for a language that
has SUVs, and predict no difﬁculty for a language that does not. But they do.
This result is further substantiated by Russian, another language where SUVs are report-
edly not difﬁcult. Unlike the Featherston (2005) experiment, Fedorenko and Gibson (Submit-
ted) ﬁnd that ﬁller informativeness does not make SUVs gradient in Russian. Figure 7.29























































































































Figure 7.27: Full SUV challenge results.
texts (Figure 7.29(a), Figure 7.29(d), Figure 7.29(e), Figure 7.29(g)) are not the hardest, and
that the acceptability judgments are relatively even.





















































































































































Figure 7.28: SUV challenge example 2: German (measure: acceptability).
(Figure 7.27(c)). But by abstracting away from the ﬁller-type issue, it is possible to consider
only the pairwise distinctions between SUVs and non-SUVs to see whether the cognitive con-
straints ﬁnd SUVs to be difﬁcult in Russian. This is shown in Figure 7.27(d). As with English
and German SUVs, the SBI and Filler features perform well. DLT does as well, but this could
be due to the subject/object alternation also considered in the experiment.
The overall pattern of results for SUVs is not as clean-cut as it is for strong and weak is-
lands. Whereas the memory theories performed poorly on the majority of the CNP sentences,
and performed well on the majority of the WHI sentences, the memory theories only performed
well on about half of the SUV experiments. Further, they performed worst on the experiments
that they should have been doing the best on, those experiments that have been posited to
support cognitive explanations of locality. However, this bad performance is explained by in-
dependent factors in the parser. Conversely, it may be these same independent factors that
allow the cognitive theories to perform well on cross-linguistic data that has been used to argue
against reductionist approaches. This topic, as well as further discussion of the comparison

















































































































































































Figure 7.29: SUV challenge example 3: Russian (measure: acceptability).
7.3 Results by phenomenon
To better understand how the cognitive constraints could explain the syntactic locality phenom-
ena, it is helpful to take a step back and consider the broader results. Section 7.3.1 details
CNPs, Section 7.3.2 details WHIs, and Section 7.3.3 details SUVs.
1497.3.1 CNP
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the CNP study results ordered by cognitive constraint. Full
circles represent experiments that are correctly modeled whereas empty circles represent
experiments that are incorrectly modeled. The table demonstrates the relatively poor perfor-
mance of the cognitive constraints on the CNP experiments. The cognitive factors only perform
well on the classic cases, and as discussed in Section 7.2.2, these results do not indicate that
the constraints explain the data. Rather, this result is likely because of the tendency within the
parser for longer dependency lengths to have more difﬁculty.
In the classic experiment, replicated in Figure 7.30, the dependency length in the island
is greater than in the non-island condition. Although features can override the tendency for
longer dependencies to be harder (see Section 7.2.4), this is not common. It is therefore likely


































































Figure 7.30: Dependency length is greater in CNP-violating contexts.
The gradience experiments from Hofmeister and Sag (2010) and Keller (1996) have length
distinctions that should also work in the parser’s favor. But the cognitive constraints perform
poorly; many do not ﬁnd the longest condition to be the most difﬁcult, even though this is the
case for the experimental data. The length-difﬁculty tendency was over-ridden, indicating a
particularly strong prediction that goes against human difﬁculty.
It is not surprising, then, that the cognitive constraints also perform poorly on the chal-






























































































































































































































































































151cognitive predictions. This includes the Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) data where doubly-
embedded structures are easier than singly-embedded structures in English and German, the
Sprouse et al. (To Appear) data that demonstrates a statistically-signiﬁcant effect of structure
and dependency length for CNP islands, and the Swedish data that demonstrates that ex-
traction from CNP islands is not difﬁcult for Swedish speakers. In each of these cases, the
cognitive constraints behave as one would expect: they model difﬁculty for length, embedding,
and extraction contra the experimental evidence. They are simply unable to handle this range
of data.
By and large, the CNP results demonstrate that cognitive constraints are hard-pressed to
explain the pattern of results from experimental data. However, they fare better for WHIs, as
discussed in the next section.
7.3.2 WHI
There are fewer useable experimental results for WHIs, likely because WHIs tend to behave
relatively uniformly and follow from cognitive predictions. For this latter reason, it is not sur-
prising that the cognitive constraints perform well across the range of classic, gradient, and
challenging data. The summary table, in Table 7.2, highlights some interesting exceptions.
Surprisingly, the classic case is not strongly modeled across phenomena, although a range
of phenomena get it. There is both a Decay and SBI element in the classic case, and although
the probabilistic ProbRetrieval performs poorly, the standard Retrieval performs well. Filler, an
interference feature based on what kind of ﬁller is being held in memory, also performs well. In
fact, it is one of the best features for this data set.
This pattern, wherein activation, interference, and composite features perform well on the



































































































































































































































































153Keller (2007) test gradience with respect to embedding, and their experiments are modeled
by nearly all the cognitive constraints. The Hofmeister and Sag (2010) and Sprouse et al.
(To Appear) data is not easily modeled; however, as discussed in the previous sections, this
has to do with experimental issues that can not be replicated by this methodology. A more
suprising result comes from Swedish: in this case, the island example, which is matched for
dependency length but adds an extra intervenor, is considered of equal difﬁculty to the non-
island case. Although the extra intervenor should be harder, each of the probabilistic features
ﬁnds the correct pattern. Retrieval does not: the extra intervenor causes more difﬁculty.
This result could be problematic because it appears to go against the cognitive predictions.
However, there is an explanation for this behavior considering the structure in the Swedish
sentences. Figure 7.31 shows the dependency analysis for the two sentences. Note that al-
though the dependency length is the same across the conditions, the dependency structure
between the two words is markedly different. There are fewer parser actions required to make
the dependency in the island than in the non-island, leading to an overall decrease in difﬁculty.
Therefore, the cognitive theories are behaving as predicted given this dependency analysis.
The relative ease of processing for the WHI in Swedish may be a result of the sentence struc-
ture itself rather than abnormal island behavior. More experimental data is needed to better
understand Swedish WHIs, but for now they do not pose a problem for a cognitive explanation

























































Figure 7.31: The dependency structure is different for WHI-violating Swedish sentences.
1547.3.3 SUV
The SUV results are between the strong and weak island results: whereas strong islands are
not modeled by cognitive theories, and weak islands are, SUVs are mostly modeled by some
of the memory theories. Table 7.3 summarizes these results.
The classic case for SUVs, in the Haider (2004) experiment, is modeled by the interference-
based features Interferers and SBI, as well as Retrieval, which includes an interference com-
ponent. For the challenging data, which includes examples of German and Russian SUVs that
do not incur difﬁculty, interference-based features handle the majority of the data. The only
data not modeled comes from the gradience examples.
There is a simple explanation for this: experimental evidence for the ﬁller-type gradience,
which each of these studies tests, goes against the difﬁculty-length tendency. In these cases,
which-N type ﬁllers are easier to process than bare ﬁllers. However, the which-N ﬁllers include
an extra word (the noun), which requires an additional parser action and brings down the over-
all difﬁculty. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 4 and Section 7.2.4. That this particular
implementation is unable to model this sequence of results, particularly since it is so preva-
lent an issue across syntactic locality phenomena is a problem; however, getting around it on
this architecture could compromise the overall model. It is therefore likely that the cognitive
theories can handle this data, but it remains to be proven.
The cognitive constraints perform better on SUVs than they do on CNPs. They do not per-
form as well as they do on WHIs, both in terms of number of features as well as experiments.
This may be due to the experimental evidence that is considered here. But, it may also shed
light on the differences between weak islands and SUVs: whereas weak island difﬁculty has
an interference and an activation component, SUV difﬁculty may simply have an interference























































































































































































































































































































156Finally, the results indicate a redrawing of the organizational chart for experimental studies
provided in Chapter 5. The new chart is in Figure 7.32. Bolded boxes indicate experiments that
can now be used to support reductionist claims, whereas dashed boxes indicate experiments
that no longer support reductionist claims. Overall, it is evident that WHI and SUV experiments




















































Figure 7.32: An updated organizational chart of syntactic locality experiments.
1577.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Comparison to other work
The main results indicate that cognitive factors encoded as probabilistic features can model
weak and non-island locality, but can not model strong islands. This supports a distinction
between the three phenomena, which may in fact be on the boundary of competence and
performance.
The distinction between strong and weak islands is as old as islands themselves. Ross
(1967) notes that WHIs should allow more extractions than strong islands, and this predic-
tion is born out and supported by a variety of syntactic and semantic studies (Rizzi, 1990;
Manzini, 1992, 1994; Szabolcsi & Zwarts, 1993). For example, Rizzi (1990) argues that weak
islands are subject to grammatical constraints like Relativized Minimality, whereas strong is-
lands are subject to stronger, path-based constraints like the Extended Category Principle
(ECP). Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) take a more semantics-based approach, wherein the
gradient behavior of WHIs is explainable because wh-words that range over individuals can
escape from weak islands, but not strong islands.
Although this work does not directly test either of these grammar-based distinctions for
strong and weak islands, it can support a competence-performance explanation, such as that
provided by Alexopoulou and Keller (2003) and Alexopoulou and Keller (2007). The authors
demonstrate experimentally that weak islands, like non-islands, are subject to memory-derived
difﬁculty like embedding, whereas strong islands are not. Their experiments are detailed in
Chapter 6, Section 7.2.2, and Section 7.2.3. The modeling work done here supports their
main conclusions: WHIs are modeled by memory constraints, whereas CNPs are not.
Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) provide an updated version of the SPLT (Gibson, 2000)
158to handle this contrast, further detailed in Chapter 4. There are a variety of differences be-
tween our methods. First, the methodology used here does not require a modiﬁcation to the
theoretical basis of existing theories to model the data: Lewis and Vasishth (2005) Activation
and Interference quantities, retrieval, the DLT, and ideas like ﬁller-type are all pulled directly
from the literature and implemented in the parser probabilistically. Like Alexopoulou and Keller
(2007), the results here demonstrate that DLT performs poorly on the data, which indicates it
may not be the best cognitive hypothesis for this data set. But, it’s not necessary to create a
new memory theory to model this data: several others do just as well modeling their results.
The second major difference between this work and Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) is that
this is a working, broad-coverage model. Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) encode by hand the
new SPLT and work it on a few examples, whereas this is tested across many languages,
phenomena, and experiments. It is possible that encoding their SPLT would provide even
better performance on this data set, which can be tested in future work. But as it stands,
this model can achieve the strong and weak island distinction with established, independently-
posited cognitive hypotheses.
Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) were not the ﬁrst to attempt a cognitive explanation of is-
lands. Kluender (1998) argues that the strong and weak island distinction is instead based
on an interaction of processing factors. Activation causes difﬁculty in strong islands, and an
additional interference effect holds with the wh-intervenor for weak islands. Thus, the strong
and weak island distinction is simply due to different types of processing difﬁculty.
Although Kluender’s hypothesis for WHIs is spot-on, the results do not support his claim for
CNPs. Despite using a variety of established processing factors in an independently-motivated
psycholinguistic model, the CNP data is not modeled. This could be a result of the type of
strong island data modeled: the complement clause CNPs considered here are not the only
kind of strong island. It may also be a result of the experiments chosen. However, these
experiments were chosen because they demonstrated a broad range of behavior (classic,
159gradient, and challenging) in different languages; one would expect the cognitive factors to
perform well on at least a few.
It may also be the case that the cognitive factors do operate as Kluender suggests as
long as they are combined. Kluender argues that it is a conﬂuence of processing factors that
predict strong islands. It is possible that the conjunction of ﬁller and activation and DLT could
model the CNP data, but the individual features do not. One of the advantages of this parsing
model, and the research design, is that it is possible to combine features into larger features
to get different predictions. Pursuing this question is a topic of future research, discussed in
Chapter 8.
Sag and his colleagues have also argued for a processing-based account to syntactic
locality. In addition to activation and interference, they argue that ﬁller-type (the basis for the
Filler feature), frequency effects, and surprisal can explain gradience in CNP and WHI data.
This model incorporates all of these factors, yet it is unable to model strong islands.
This may be because CNPs are just hard. In the experimental evidence, the reading time
differences for CNPs aren’t as great as they are for WHIs in the Hofmeister and Sag (2010)
experiments for both phenomena. This is what the Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) data indi-
cates as well. Perhaps the human subjects reach a certain level of difﬁculty after which any
evidence of gradience is unreliable. The parser itself ﬁnds the CNPs to be around the same
level of difﬁculty: all very difﬁcult, and any gradience doesn’t seem to make a difference. This
points to a concern with experimental design: if sentences are difﬁcult, how much does a
statistically-signiﬁcant difference in reading time mean?
This is similar to an argument against reductionist accounts by Phillips (In Press). He ar-
gues that memory factors, like ﬁller-type, may cause slightly gradient behavior in even ungram-
matical sentences. The problem is that the distinction between ungrammatical, unacceptable,
and difﬁcult sentences is unclear, as is further discussed in Chapter 5.1.
160These results support Phillips and his colleagues’ claims for strong islands, but do not sup-
port their claims for weak and non-island locality. The cognitive factors model these phenom-
ena relatively effortlessly, without recourse to speciﬁc grammatical constraints like Relativized
Minimality. In fact, as discussed in Boston (2010), a version of Relativized Minimality encoded
in the parser performs badly on all but the classic examples. It may be that the probabilistic
grammar is sensitive to a particular grammatical constraint across all the languages and the
treebanks, helping along these memory constraints. But this grammatical factor appears to be
probabilistic and frequency-based, not a hard constraint.
7.4.2 CNPs: Argument from a null result
To view these results as supporting a competence-performance explanation of the strong and
weak island distinction, the negative result for CNPs is crucial. But, it is a null result, and there-
fore a weaker argument than could be made if the parser could model the behavior in some
way. The parser’s inability to model CNPs could be because there actually is a competence-
performance explanation of strong and weak islands, and cognitive factors simply can not
model them. This is argued by Alexopoulou and Keller (2007). But, it is also possible that
these cognitive factors require integration as Kluender argues, or that a different type of cog-
nitive constraint, such as integration, is required. And it may just be that this particular model
has a crucial shortcoming that does not allow it to accurately model the cognitive factors in
relation to CNPs.
If Alexopoulou and Keller (2007) are correct, an extra grammatical constraint is required to
model the CNP results. One possibility from the linguistic literature is the ECP, Empty Category
Principle (Aoun et al., 1982). The ECP requires traces, or gaps in psycholinguistic terminology,
be properly governed by their antecedents, or ﬁllers, as is detailed in Chapter 2. Unfortunately,
this constraint can not be implemented in the parser because the parser can not encode c-
161command. C-command can not be encoded in dependency grammar because it requires a
notion of hierarchy: it is not possible to encode dominance such that x does not dominate y, y
does not dominate x, and the maximal projection of x dominates y. Future work on a parser
operating on a more constrained formalism, such as TAG (Joshi, Levy, & Takahashi, 1975) or
Minimalist Grammars (Stabler, 1997) is required to test whether the addition of a grammatical
constraint can allow the computational model to handle CNPs.
Alternatively, it could be that no grammatical constraint is necessary. As Kluender argues,
an interaction of the cognitive factors that are considered here, such as combining DLT with De-
cay, may provide the correct recipe for a reductionist account of strong islands. It’s also possible
that the winning recipe requires some other cognitive feature, or even a non-cognitive feature
from the dependency parsing community that hasn’t been tested yet. Examining these possi-
bilities is possible and relatively easy to do given this parser design. Unfortunately, though, it
requires a signiﬁcant time commitment requiring testing and data analysis across all possible
combinations of features. Given the eight features above, there are 246 combinations of fea-
ture pairs, triples, etc. This process can of course be automated to reduce analysis time, but it
falls outside the scope of this work.
Finally, the third possible reason why CNPs are not modeled is because of a ﬂaw within
the parser. The nature of modeling is such that there can never be a perfect model. As was
detailed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, computational models necessitate explicit decisions when
there is no clear correct or well-supported answer. There are many decisions that may have
prevented the parser from modeling these sentences, from the parsing algorithm, the grammar,
the treebanks, the syntactic analyses, the complexity measures, the cognitive factors, their
encoding as features, etc. But, these decisions were not made arbitrarily; they were made,
as often as possible, thoughtfully and with the support of previous work. A complete story
of syntactic locality modeling would consider each of these alternations and compare results
to ﬁnd the best possible model for syntactic locality. But, by necessity, this complete story is
162beyond the scope of this dissertation.
7.4.3 WHIs: A reductionst phenomenon
Of the three phenomena, the cognitive factors perform best on WHIs. Nearly every experiment
is modeled by a wide range of features, but the best-performing features across the experi-
ments are Decay, SBI, and Filler. This result supports arguments by Kluender (1998) and
Hofmeister and Sag (2010) that weak islands are explainable by a combination of processing
factors. The result is also predicted because WHIs are susceptible to activation and interfer-
ence effects, and behave as the cognitive theories would predict. The only experiment that
could not be modeled is explained by a dependency-length mismatch, and the tendency for
surprisals to be higher for longer dependencies. Although there are fewer WHI studies mod-
eled than CNP and SUV studies, this is because there is relatively little variation, both within
the English experimental evidence and cross-linguistically. Overall, the WHI result supports
reductionist accounts of weak islands.
7.4.4 SUVs: Insight from a computational model
SUVs can be modeled by a speciﬁc set of cognitive factors that take into account interference.
This result is clear if the gradience experiments are ignored because of dependency length
mismatches. The well-modeled experiments provide insight into several on-going controver-
sies. For example, linguists have long-argued that SUVs are acceptable in German, a position
supported by Fanselow and F´ ery (2007). But, Featherston (2005) provides acceptability judg-
ments that demonstrate strong SUV unacceptability for German speakers, questioning not only
the role of superiority violations in German, but also the syntactic judgments used by linguists.
Fanselow and F´ ery (2007) then conduct a follow-up acceptability experiment to demonstrate
163that Featherston’s results are most likely driven by case differences rather than SUVs within
the sentence. Their results indicate that Germans ﬁnd SUVs to be just as acceptable as non-
SUVs.
This model supports the original linguistic intuitions and the Fanselow and F´ ery (2007)
results; it does not ﬁnd SUVs to be more difﬁcult than non-SUVs in German. The parser’s
behavior is the same across all the German experimental data, including Featherston’s. Note
that the only difference between the parsing model for English, where the parser ﬁnds SUVs
difﬁcult, and German, where the parser does not ﬁnd SUVs difﬁcult, is the treebank. This
different behavior should pose a problem for the cognitive factors, but it does not. This is
likely due to some aspect of the probabilistic grammar and the dependency analysis itself that
aids SUVs in German, but is unavailable in English. What it may be is a question for future
research, but this result emphasizes the utility of explicit computational models in linguistic
work: the German SUV data should be a challenge to reductionist accounts, yet factors like
frequency information, surprisal, and architectural mechanisms can interact in surprising and
complex ways to aid in modeling the data.
Finally, unlike WHIs, SUVs are best-modeled by features that take into account one par-
ticular cognitive theory: interference. Activation and ﬁller-type are less useful for this type of
syntactic locality. Within linguistics, SUVs and WHIs are handled by two different mechanisms,
Relativized Minimality and Subjacency. But, this model indicates that the distinction between
WHIs and SUVs could instead be based on different types of cognitive factors, precisely as is
argued by Kluender (1998).
1647.5 Conclusion
The original intent of this research was to build a computational model that could inform the
competence-performance divide. This idea is not novel: in fact, many researchers have
demonstrated the utility of computational work for explaining phenomena that straddle the
divide between grammar and processing (Kimball, 1973; Wanner & Maratsos, 1978; Marcus,
1980; Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Bresnan & Kaplan, 1982). This model is a small contribution
towards the goal of understanding the complexities of syntactic locality. The results demon-
strate that a computational model armed with cognitive constraints performs surprisingly well
on a variety of syntactic locality phenomena. Although the model points out shortcomings in
both grammatical and reductionist accounts, it also highlights the strengths in well-thought-





The objective of this research is to build a computational model that tests reductionist expla-
nations of syntactic locality. This model tests a range of experimental data against cognitive
constraints, seeking to illuminate the nature of syntactic locality and its role in the competence-
performance debate. This chapter discusses how the results fulﬁll these objectives. Sec-
tion 8.2 summarizes the ﬁndings and their implications, while Section 8.3 discusses what
these ﬁndings contribute to the ﬁeld. Section 8.4 discusses directions for future research,
and Section 8.5 concludes.
8.2 Summary of ﬁndings
The ﬁndings support reductionist accounts for some syntactic locality phenomena, namely
weak islands and superiority violations. In particular, reductionist accounts that focus on work-
ing memory retrieval are able to model the phenomena. Whereas difﬁculty in weak islands is
associated with both activation and interference, difﬁculty for superiority violations appears to
mainly be a result of interference difﬁculty.
Strong islands are not modeled by the retrieval-based cognitive constraints considered
in this work. This indicates that the differences between strong and weak islands are real,
and may even span the competence and performance divide. It is also possible that strong
islands, like weak islands, are explained by processing factors, but by different factors than are
considered here. In particular, storage-based accounts of working memory difﬁculty were not
166tested, and could provide a reductionist explanation of difﬁculty.
These results support a methodology that uses broad-coverage statistical parsers to test a
wide range of experimental data. They also support encoding cognitive factors as probabilistic
features. This encoding practice has two beneﬁts. First, it provides a standard for comparison
across cognitive theories. Secondly, it limits the computational model’s memory in a cognitively
plausible way, providing a more realistic human sentence processing model.
8.3 Contributions
The methodology used here provides a variety of novel approaches to the often difﬁcult and
non-standard task of human sentence processing modeling. It provides a method for aggregat-
ing data from experiments that use many methodologies and often support opposing claims.
The methodology organizes the experimental data into categories based on whether they con-
ﬁrm or contradict reductionist claims, and uses cross-linguistic data as often as possible. This
classiﬁcation of experimental data, and use of many experimental data points, allows for a
broad-coverage approach that lessens the risk of overﬁtting the data. This methodology can
be useful for researchers interested in speciﬁc phenomena rather than a range of difﬁculties,
and can ﬁll-in until standard test sets are available for human sentence processing models.
At a more theoretical level, this research combines the long tradition of computational lo-
cality models (Marcus, 1980; Berwick & Weinberg, 1984; Deane, 1991; Frank, 1992; Pritchett,
1992, 1993) with the long tradition of cognitive models of language (Gibson, 1991; Just & Car-
penter, 1992; Lewis, 1993, 1996; Gibson, 1998, 2000; Lewis, 1999; Vosse & Kempen, 2000;
Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Just & Varma, 2007). The ﬁrst computational models that specif-
ically address syntactic locality focus on how grammatical locality constraints derive from a
deterministic parsing architecture (Marcus, 1980; Berwick & Weinberg, 1984). These models
167demonstrate that local attachments are preferred architecturally, thereby demonstrating the
strong link between the grammar and parser. Subsequent work by Frank (1992) provides fur-
ther support for an approach that maintains strong competence, or a direct correspondence
between grammar rules and parser operations (Bresnan & Kaplan, 1982). Frank, however,
argues that locality constraints reside in the grammar, and demonstrates how they help a
sentence processing model predict island difﬁculty. Both of these contributions focus on gram-
matical constraints, and whether the grammatical constraints arise from the architecture or
from the grammar. Although this model also instantiates the strong competence hypothesis, it
focuses on cognitive rather than grammatical constraints.
Deane (1991) and Pritchett (1993) describe models that similarly test cognitive constraints
against syntactic locality data. But unlike these implementations, this work does not argue for
a speciﬁc cognitive hypothesis or explanation of the phenomena. Rather, it takes advantage
of broad-coverage parsing to test a variety of cognitive principles, including those argued for
by Deane and Pritchett. Pritchett argues that syntactic locality difﬁculty is caused by unre-
coverable parsing errors when attempting to attach a ﬁller to its gap. Like Pritchett, this work
localizes the difﬁculty to this particular attachment, but this research does not consider how the
cognitive constraints could prevent the attachment. Rather, the work considers the difﬁculty of
the attachment once it has been made. Pritchett’s model is able to account for Subjacency,
particularly CNP difﬁculty, which is the phenomenon that this model struggles with. Therefore,
it would be interesting in the future to run the parser to test attachment rather than difﬁculty,
to see whether this would allow strong island difﬁculty to be handled by these cognitive con-
straints. However, this may be detrimental for WHI and SUV modeling.
Like Deane, this work argues that working memory can account for both the ease and the
difﬁculty in processing certain long-distance dependencies. Deane details a model of syntactic
locality based on spreading activation in memory, and how memory decay contributes to island
difﬁculty. The Decay and Retrieval probabilistic features used here use speciﬁc cognitive-based
168measures of spreading activation, and can be thought of as a variant of Deane’s spreading ac-
tivation hypothesis. However, this model also incorporates interference-based measures that
are found to be helpful in modeling syntactic locality. Further, this model tests more phenom-
ena and languages than the Deane model. Regardless, many of the ideas from Deane’s work
are applicable to this model as well.
In fact, this work builds on the many computational models of language that speciﬁcally ad-
dress diverse cognitive constraints in sentence processing1. The current work in many ways
simply applies the hypotheses put forth by these cognitive models to the syntactic locality data.
Some implementations account for human sentence processing difﬁculty on the basis of acti-
vation, such as the Uniﬁcation Space Model of Vosse and Kempen (2000), CC READER (Just
& Carpenter, 1992), and its modern implementation, CAPS (Just & Varma, 2002). In each
of these systems, the amount of memory affects the structure being built; in the Uniﬁcation
Space Model, the structures are lexicalized and very similar to the DG approach considered
here.
Most DLT-based models consider the effect of storage cost of unsatisﬁed elements (Gibson,
1991, 1998, 2000; Alexopoulou & Keller, 2007; Demberg & Keller, 2008; Demberg-Winterfors,
2010). This work considers DLT in a different way: not only is the DLT used as a model of
integration cost and less a model of storage cost, but it is also adapted to broad-coverage
parsing. The second modiﬁcation is similar to previous work by Demberg and Keller (2008)
and Demberg-Winterfors (2010) that implements the DLT on broad-coverage model. In the
Demberg-Winterfors (2010) model, though, the DLT is part of a new complexity metric that
combines a DLT-like metric with a probabilistic metric, surprisal. In some ways, one could
consider this current work as a combination of the DLT, and several other memory-based
hypotheses, and surprisal. Whereas Demberg-Winterfors explicitly combines the two in a
1There is a large literature on connectionist models of human sentence processing (Elman, 1990, 1991; Tabor
et al., 1997; Tabor & Tanenhaus, 1999; Christiansen & Chater, 1999), but symbolic and hybrid architectures are
considered here.
169new metric, in this work the two are combined in the probabilistic space: the DLT deﬁnes the
probability space, and surprisal then measures difﬁculty based on this space. It is unclear how
these methodologies differ; it would be necessary to apply them to the same data to better
understand how the two relate.
This model also builds off of implementations that consider the effect of interference on
sentence processing (Lewis, 1993, 1996, 1999; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). In many ways, the
notion of SBI used here, which comes from Lewis and Vasishth (2005), is a direct descendent
of the interference implementations ﬁrst coded in NL-SOAR by Lewis. However, this work only
considers retrieval interference and does not consider how storage interference could lead to
processing difﬁculty in syntactic locality sentences.
Finally, the Decay, SBI, and ProbRetrieval features, as well as the Retrieval complexity
metric, all directly come from the retrieval theory and computational implementation in Lewis
and Vasishth (2005). This work simply adapts this system to the Nivre dependency transi-
tion system, as detailed in Chapter 4. The chapter also details several important differences
between this implementation and the Lewis and Vasishth implementation, the most important
of which is the nature of the memory in the system. In particular, this parser does not en-
code a difference between procedural and declarative memory, an important part of the Lewis
and Vasishth system. It also uses a limitless stack-based memory, not the more human-like
associative memory in the previous system.
This model undoubtedly owes much to the many implementations that have come before
it. However, it is different because it combines computational modeling with many cognitive
constraints to test a speciﬁc linguistic phenomenon. While it is most similar to human sentence
processing models that directly encode memory difﬁculty (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005), its focus is
a topic at the heart of grammar, reminiscent of classic locality models (Marcus, 1980; Berwick
& Weinberg, 1984). Yet it is not the ﬁrst computational model of reductionist claims of syntactic
locality (Deane, 1991; Pritchett, 1993); unlike these predecessors, though, the focus of this
170work is not to prove a speciﬁc reductionist account. Rather, it is to better understand the many
theories implicated in reductionist accounts, and to test them against a wide range of data.
This contribution, though small in the large literature of syntactic locality, has been missing in
this crucial linguistic debate.
8.4 Future work
Despite the relative simplicity of this model, there are a variety of testable hypotheses avail-
able in the current implementation that, due to lack of time, are as yet unexplored. First, by
encoding the constraints as probabilistic features, the framework supports a method for directly
comparing multiple cognitive theories. An additional beneﬁt, though, is that the probabilistic
features can be combined to generate new predictions. For example, retrieval theory argues
that sentence processing difﬁculty is a result of two quantities: word decay and similarity-based
interference. The theory combines these two as simple addends. Yet, it is equally possible to
have the combination mixed by a machine learning algorithm, and generate new predictions
that can provide more information on working memory difﬁculty. Similarly, it is possible that
while the similarity-based interference quantity that retrieval argues for is accurate, a more
accurate measure of decay is something simpler, like string distance. Or perhaps both are
needed. The advantage of the probabilistic model is that each of these combinations can be
compared, directly testing Kluender’s “conﬂuence of factors” theory.
The current implementation has the added advantage of having multiple methods of pre-
dicting processing difﬁculty. This work considers how difﬁcult it is to make the correct attach-
ment given the correct parse. But, the architecture also supports k-best search, such that
the model can take into account an arbitrary number of analyses to determine what amount
of memory is required to make the attachment. For example, it may be the case that a se-
rial parser can make relatively easy, non-violating attachments, but a highly parallel parser is
171required to make attachments in islands. This provides another estimate of working memory
difﬁculty that is quite different from the difﬁculty argued for in reductionist accounts. Yet, it can
be combined with these accounts, as demonstrated in previous work on superiority violations
(Boston, 2010).
This alternative method of testing difﬁculty, based on whether the parser creates an attach-
ment in an island-violating condition or not, implements an accurate test for reductionist ac-
counts that is not often considered (Phillips, In Press). Although this work considers complexity
metrics like surprisal and retrieval, these metrics require the attachment be made. However,
as Phillips points out, this is not a foregone conclusion. An evaluation of this approach is left
to future work.
This work uses two distinct complexity metrics, surprisal and retrieval. In recent work,
attempts have been made to create an over-arching complexity metric that combines both
surprisal-based quantities and memory-based quantities in the form of the DLT (Demberg-
Winterfors, 2010). Although the combination metric works well, in this work each is considered
separately. Yet by calculating suprisal based on cognitive features like the DLT, the complexity
metrics are being combined. In future work, it would be interesting to see how this method
compares to the other.
The original goal was to create and evaluate a model that encodes both grammatical and
cognitive constraints for syntactic locality. Unfortunately, that was not possible because many
of the most promising grammatical constraints require more restrictive MCSG formalisms.
Some, like Relativized Minimality (Rizzi, 1990; Cinque, 1990), were implemented, as dis-
cussed in previous work (Boston, 2010). It seems the most promising model for strong islands
would incorporate both grammatical and cognitive constraints. A model that includes an ECP-
like constraint, while at the same time using retrieval-based cognitive features like activation,
may provide an accurate model of the gradience evident in strong island data. However, as
has been discussed in previous chapters, it is impossible to accurately encode the ECP in a
172dependency parser. A move to a more restrictive formalism, such as a Minimalist Grammar
parser, would be necessary in future work.
8.5 Conclusion
This research satisﬁes the original research objective, which is to build a computational model
that illuminates the nature of syntactic locality. Yet the laundry list of questions that this re-
search has raised, as well as the many tasks left for future work, highlight the difﬁculty of
syntactic locality data. In the larger debate on grammatical versus reductionist approaches,
and the even greater debate on competence and performance in linguistics, this research pro-
vides a small computational perspective that afﬁrms previously held beliefs: syntactic locality,
and language, is explained by a combination of grammatical and cognitive factors. However,
by combining the methodologies of linguistics, psycholinguistics, and computational linguis-
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CFG Context Free Grammar, 43
CNPs Complex Noun Phrase Islands, 3
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DLT Dependency Locality Theory, 5
ECP Empty Category Principle, 18
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